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Abstract of the Dissertation 
Essays on Regional Economic Integration in East Asia 
by 
Teerasak Sapwarobol 
Claremont Graduate University: 2012 
 
This dissertation seeks to understand the pattern of trade and portfolio 
investment in East Asian economies and how trade integration can affect the level of 
bilateral asset holdings. On the trade side, the determinants of bilateral trade flow is 
examined at the product level, not the aggregate, so as to assess the impact of RTAs 
across product types as well as the nature of the home market effect and the role of 
similarity of demand structures. On the financial side, the dissertation synthesizes 
analyses of the composition of cross-border portfolio holdings in East Asian 
economies, focusing on the importance of capital market development as well as a 
linkage between goods and financial markets. 
The dissertation begins with a re-examination of the determinants of bilateral 
trade in differentiated, reference-priced, and homogeneous products over the period 
of 1983-2000. The results suggest that trade liberalization under the ASEAN PTA 
and AFTA frameworks played a significant role in promoting intra-regional trade in 
differentiated and reference-priced, but perhaps not homogeneous products. The weak 
evidence of trade creation in homogeneous products reflects the fact that the 
implementation of trade liberalization among ASEAN states has provided limited 
benefits to its members due to waivers of concessions. Despite the massive increase 
   
 
iv 
 
in intra-ASEAN trade, nevertheless, the findings reveal that the formation of RTAs in 
the region did not lead to trade diversion in any product category. 
The analysis of the composition of cross-border portfolio holdings in East 
Asian financial markets employs a panel dataset of the IMF’s CPIS over the period of 
2001-2009. One key finding from the analysis is that the volume of bilateral imports 
appeared to play a significant role in spurring cross-border portfolio holdings in East 
Asian financial markets. In particular, the dissertation shows empirically that the 
development of the capital markets in East Asia has become one of the key factors in 
attracting foreign portfolio investment from most regions of the world. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
The years after the onset of the East Asian financial crises of 1997-98 saw 
East Asian countries suffer severe economic downturn and a substantial reversal in 
capital flow. These crises, in turn, marked a major turning point for deepening and 
widening economic collaboration among East Asian countries. One of the most 
striking features of the economic rebalancing process in this region has been the rapid 
proliferation of regional trade agreement (RTAs) among East Asian countries.
1 
The fact that intra-regional trade in the region continues to increase after the 
formation of the RTAs, indeed, raises some concern of whether the members of these 
trading blocs have benefited from the RTAs without damaging the trade and welfare 
of non-members. Although a large body of literature has attempted to assess the 
degree of trade creation and diversion effects of the RTAs in the region, almost all of 
the investigations only looked at the aggregate level. Given that the degree of trade 
liberalization under the ASEAN PTA and AFTA frameworks was different across 
product types, the assessment at the aggregate level alone would be misleading since 
the RTAs could play different roles in redirecting trade flows. In this regard, re-
examining the effect of RTAs on bilateral trade flows at the product level would be 
crucial to better understanding the pattern of trade in East Asia. 
On the financial side, the post-crisis consensus held that the East Asian 
financial crises were triggered by the failure of supervision and regulation in the 
financial sector. The process of financial integration in East Asia has been more 
                                                             
1 See Appendix A1.1 for the list of all ASEAN Plus Three PTAs in force. 
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muted than intra-regional trade integration, and the financial markets in the region are 
more integrated with Western Europe and the United States than with each other 
(Eichengreen and Park, 2003). Several studies argued that one key lesson from these 
crises is perhaps the condition of economic interdependence. East Asian countries 
have realized that the crisis and panic from Thailand could spread throughout the 
region as contagion. To forestall future financial crises, deeper financial integration 
and collaboration to manage external shocks in the region are needed. 
Since then, the process of financial cooperation in East Asia has been 
strengthened consistently through the framework of ASEAN + 3 such as the Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) and the Asian Regional Bond Markets 
Initiative (ABMI).
2 Capital market development in the region has been progressing, 
with a steady increase in the ratio of market capitalization to GDP. In particular, the 
efforts to deepen regional financial integration has witnessed a substantial increase in 
cross-border asset investment among the East Asian countries and the acceleration of 
this bilateral asset investment seems to coincide with a surge in the volume of intra-
regional trade. 
This dissertation seeks to understand the pattern of trade and portfolio 
investment in East Asian economies and how, if any, trade integration can affect the 
level of bilateral asset holdings. On the trade side, the determinants of bilateral trade 
flow is examined at the product level, not the aggregate one, so as to assess the 
impact of the RTAs across product types as well as the nature of the home market 
effect and the role of similarity of demand structures. On the financial side, the 
                                                             
2 The ASEAN Plus Three (APT) countries consists of China, Japan, South Korea, and 10 member 
states of ASEAN. 
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dissertation synthesizes analyses of the composition of cross-border portfolio 
holdings in East Asian economies, focusing on the importance of capital market 
development as well as a linkage between goods and financial market. This 
dissertation will be particularly useful for policy makers to better understand the 
patterns of trade and foreign portfolio investment in East Asia, and therefore be able 
to deploy resources more efficiently and effectively. 
The dissertation begins with the re-examination of the determinants of 
bilateral trade in differentiated, reference-priced, and homogeneous products using 
panel data covering 155 countries over the period of 1983-2000. This dissertation 
employs the gravity model with various different econometric techniques (i.e., year-
specific fixed effects, country-pair fixed effects, and country-specific fixed effects) to 
control for the multilateral resistance terms. 
The results suggest that trade liberalization under the ASEAN PTA and AFTA 
frameworks played a significant role in promoting intra-regional trade in 
differentiated and reference-priced, but perhaps not homogeneous products. The weak 
evidence of trade creation in homogeneous products reflects the fact that the 
implementation of trade liberalization among ASEAN states has provided limited 
benefits to its members due to a waiver of any concession. Nevertheless, despite the 
massive increase in intra-ASEAN trade, the findings reveal that the formation of the 
RTAs in the region did not lead to trade diversion in all product categories. 
Indeed, breaking bilateral imports into three categories allow us not only to 
examine the influence of RTAs on international trade at the product level, but also to 
test the nature of the home market effect and the Linder hypothesis across product 
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types. In the former case, the theory of the home market effect asserts that firms tend 
to choose a location to produce and export goods in a country with high level of 
domestic demand to gain economies of scale as well as to reduce transaction costs. 
Once regional trading blocs are established, this theory would be particularly 
interesting since firms are now able to choose a location even more freely and 
efficiently. In such circumstances, it seems plausible that trade integration is likely to 
influence not only bilateral trade flows across countries, but also industries within the 
trading blocs. This dissertation applies the methodology of Feenstra, Markusen, and 
Rose (2001) to test the home market effect through the coefficients of importing and 
exporting countries’ GDPs in the gravity equation. In the latter case, the Linder 
conjecture presumes a positive correlation between similar demand structure (i.e., 
taste indifferences) and the level of bilateral trade. This conjecture is examined in 
Chapter 2 to see whether the similarity of demand structures has played a role in 
determining the pattern of trade both in international trade generally and from the 
perspective of APT countries in particular, and how this hypothesis varies across 
product categories. 
The analysis of the composition of cross-border portfolio holdings in East 
Asian financial markets is presented in Chapter 3. This chapter utilizes a panel dataset 
of the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) covering 10 host 
countries in East Asia over the period of 2001-2009. The objective of this analysis is 
to explore the role of capital market development in host countries as well as the link 
between trade and financial market integration. Although much of the existing 
empirical literatures on the determinants of cross-border portfolio investment 
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consider the influence of bilateral trade in goods in spurring financial flows, none has 
attempted to investigate the role of capital market development in host and investing 
countries. Incorporating these factors together in the model is particularly interesting 
because it allows us not only to explore what characteristics tended to encourage 
bilateral portfolio investments, but also to compare their distinct characteristics. 
One key finding from the analysis is that the volume of bilateral imports 
appeared to play a significant role in spurring cross-border portfolio holdings in East 
Asian financial markets. This positive correlation can be explained through several 
mechanisms such as familiarity effects and information transmission. In particular, 
the dissertation shows empirically that the development of the capital markets in East 
Asia has become one of the key factors in attracting foreign portfolio investment from 
most regions of the world. 
Concluding remarks are presented in Chapter 4. The chapter begins with a 
synthesis of the findings from the previous chapters. Thereafter, the chapter discusses 
the empirical limitations of the dissertation as well as providing recommendations for 
future research and policy implications. 
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Appendix A1.1: List of All ASEAN Plus Three PTAs in Force, as of July 2010 
RTA name Coverage Type Date of entry into force 
ASEAN - Australia - New Zealand Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 January 2010 
ASEAN - China 
 
Goods & Services 
 
PTA & EIA 
 
1 January 2005 (Goods) 
1 July 2007 (Services) 
ASEAN - Japan Goods FTA 1 December 2008 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)3 Goods FTA 28 January 1992 
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement 
(APTA)4 
Goods 
 
PTA 
 
17 June 1976 
 
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement 
(APTA) - Accession of China5 
Goods 
 
PTA 
 
1 January 2002 
 
Brunei Darussalam - Japan Goods & Services FTA & EIA 31 July 2008 
Chile - China Goods FTA 1 October 2006 
Chile - Japan Goods & Services FTA & EIA 3 September 2007 
China - Hong Kong, China Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 January 2004 
China - Macao, China Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 January 2004 
China - New Zealand Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 October 2008 
China - Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 January 2009 
EFTA - Korea, Republic of 6 Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 September 2006 
EFTA - Singapore7 Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 January 2003 
Global System of Trade Preferences 
among Developing Countries 
(GSTP)8 
Goods 
 
PTA 
 
19 April 1989 
 
India - Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 August 2005 
Japan - Indonesia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 July 2008 
Japan - Malaysia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 13 July 2006 
Japan - Mexico Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 April 2005 
Japan - Philippines Goods & Services FTA & EIA 11 December 2008 
Japan - Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 30 November 2002 
Japan - Switzerland Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 September 2009 
Japan - Thailand Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 November 2007 
Japan - Viet Nam Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 October 2009 
Jordan - Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 22 August 2005 
                                                             
3 ASEAN members: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. 
4 Member countries: Bangladesh, India, Republic of Korea, Laos, and Sri Lanka. 
5 Member countries: Bangladesh, India, Republic of Korea, Laos, Sri Lanka, and China. 
6 Member countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, and Republic of Korea. 
7 Member countries: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland, and Singapore. 
8 Member countries: Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Viet Nam, and Zimbabwe. 
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Appendix A1.1: (cont.) 
RTA name Coverage Type Date of entry into force 
Korea, Republic of - ASEAN 
 
Goods & Services 
 
FTA & EIA 
 
1 January 2010 (Goods) 
1 May 2009 (Services) 
Korea, Republic of - Chile Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 April 2004 
Korea, Republic of - India Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 January 2010 
Korea, Republic of - Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 2 March 2006 
Lao People's Democratic Republic - 
Thailand 
Goods 
 
PTA 
 
20 June 1991 
 
New Zealand - Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 January 2001 
Pakistan - China 
 
Goods & Services 
 
FTA & EIA 
 
1 July 2007 (Goods) 
10 October 2009 
(Services) 
Pakistan - Malaysia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 January 2008 
Panama - Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 24 July 2006 
Peru - China Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 March 2010 
Peru - Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 August 2009 
Protocol on Trade Negotiations 
(PTN)9 
Goods 
 
PTA 
 
11 February 1973 
 
Singapore - Australia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 28 July 2003 
Thailand - Australia Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 January 2005 
Thailand - New Zealand Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 July 2005 
Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic 
Partnership10 
Goods & Services 
 
FTA & EIA 
 
28 May 2006 
 
US - Singapore Goods & Services FTA & EIA 1 January 2004 
Source: WTO 
Note: ―FTA‖ is Free Trade Agreement, ―EIA‖ is Economic Integration Agreement, and ―PTA‖ is 
Preferential Trade Agreement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
9 Member countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Israel, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Serbia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Uruguay. 
10 Member countries: Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Emergence of East Asian Regionalism: Trade Issues 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent empirical studies have highlighted the significance of regional 
economic integration in promoting intra-regional trade in most blocs.
11
 Aitken (1973), 
for instance, found that the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) generated a cumulative growth in 
gross trade creation (GTC) during 1959-67.
12
 By 1967, the estimated values of the 
GTC amounted to approximately $9.2 billion (EEC) and $1.3 billion (EFTA). 
Thornton and Goglio (2002) demonstrated the advantage of being a member of 
ASEAN in promoting intra-regional trade by 52 percent over non-member countries 
in the region. These gains resulted from broadening trade liberalization since the late 
1980s. Gilbert et al. (2001)’s empirical result illustrated the accomplishment of 
ASEAN in promoting manufactured trade, while the lack of strong statistical 
evidence made it difficult to conclude whether agricultural trade has benefited from 
the AFTA. They also found that trade among the APEC members was roughly 2.7 
times higher than that of other similar economies, even though no progress have been 
made in further strengthening the Asia-Pacific community since its implementation. 
Note that although several economically-integrated communities have benefited from 
                                                             
11 Note that the degree of economic integration can be classified as follows: 1) preferential trading 
area, 2) free trade area, 3) customs union, 4) single market, 5) economic and monetary union, and 6) 
complete economic integration. 
12 As noted in Aitken (1973), ―gross trade creation (GTC) will refer to the total increase in trade 
among members of a trading community brought about through integration, regardless of whether the 
additional trade replaces domestic production or whether it replaces non-member exports.‖ 
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the trading blocs, NAFTA’s effect on trade remained less clear. That is, while 
Krueger (2000) found the dramatic increase in the share of NAFTA members in the 
US market and the expansion of Mexican trade was trade creation, Gilbert et al. 
(2001)’ s evidence revealed the negative impact of the bloc on trade. 
The significance of the trade creation effect, in turn, has raised concern as to 
whether the trading blocs actually represent building or stumbling blocks. In theory, 
although the formation of regional trade agreements (recognized as a second best for 
international trade) tends to have immediate negative impacts on non-member states, 
they need not necessarily mean that the volume of trade between member and non-
member states will decline over the long run. In the long run, the formation of RTAs 
can result in several positive dynamic consequences of enlarged market size including 
economies of scale, economies of specialization, more competitive trade structures, 
knowledge spillovers, and economic growth.  
One of the most striking aspects of economic integration recently has been the 
impacts of ASEAN integration on trade creation and trade diversion. The fact that 
intra-ASEAN trade has continued to increase (in terms of both value and the 
percentage share of total trade) over the past decades raises some concern of whether 
the bloc has generated extra-regional trade bias. Although recent empirical work 
(such as Elliott and Ikemoto, 2004; and Magee, 2008) has shown that trade 
integration in Southeast Asia does not appear to have had a negative impact on extra-
ASEAN trade, none of the existing studies has attempted to estimate the impacts of 
the ASEAN trading bloc on bilateral trade flows at the product level. 
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In addition, it seems plausible that trade integration between ASEAN plus 
three (APT) countries is likely to influence not only bilateral trade flows across 
countries, but also industries within the region due to the ―home market effect.‖ 13 As 
has been argued in Hanson and Xiang (2002), lowering trade barriers makes large 
countries more attractive in very high transport cost industries, while moderately high 
transport cost industries tend to move into well-located small economies. Because of 
the absence of tariff and non-tariff barriers in the region, firms are able to choose a 
location more freely and efficiently and they, according to the theory of the home 
market effect, tend to locate and produce goods in countries with high levels of 
demand to gain economies of scale as well as to reduce transaction costs. 
Accordingly, it is rational for transnational corporations to engage in outsourcing 
across countries as component production bases to exploit comparative advantage 
from differences in factor endowments across the region (Arndt, 2001).  
Unfortunately, the lack of empirical evidence for the nature of the home 
market effect in the region and the impacts of ASEAN on bilateral trade at the 
product level makes it difficult to understand the pattern of trade for APT countries. 
This chapter tries to close this gap by investigating the role of three particular factors 
that may influence bilateral trade flows at the product level. Firstly and most 
importantly, the chapter attempts to measure the magnitude of trade creation and 
trade diversion (by commodity) under ASEAN framework agreements. Secondly, the 
nature of the home market effect is examined. And lastly, this chapter tests whether 
                                                             
13 Note that APT countries consist of Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Japan, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Viet 
Nam. 
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the similarity of demand structures between APT countries plays a role in 
determining the pattern of trade. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview on the 
development of ASEAN economic integration. The economics of regionalism in 
Southeast Asia is reviewed in section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents methodology and 
variables. Section 2.5 reports the empirical results and section 2.6 concludes. 
 
2.2 The Development of ASEAN Economic Integration: An Overview 
The success of regional economic communities in many parts of the world 
along with the increasing global competitiveness during the late 1980s and 1990s 
induced economists and authorities in East Asia to pay particular attention to the 
opportunities for both widening and deepening economic collaboration in the region. 
Despite the regional cooperation in East Asia that started with the establishment of 
ASEAN in 1967, it was not until the 1970s that the original 5 members (Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) agreed upon the program of 
ASEAN economic cooperation through the ASEAN preferential trading arrangements 
(ASEAN PTA), following the Bali Summit in 1976.
14
 The ASEAN PTA was 
intended to encourage trade and accelerate industrial development in the Southeast 
Asian region by providing preferential tariff reduction to products that originate from 
ASEAN members. 
However, as noted in Cuyvers et al. (2005), the ASEAN PTA played only a 
limited role in promoting intra-ASEAN trade due to the fact that its framework of 
                                                             
14 These economic co-operations include the ASEAN industrial projects (AIP), the preferential trading 
arrangements (PTA), and the ASEAN industrial cooperation (AIC) schemes. See further discussion in 
www.aseansec.org. 
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offering preferential tariff treatment to products originating from member states was 
narrow. Moreover, for many products, the ASEAN PTA framework had limited 
impact since the tariff rates for these products were already zero (Naya, 2004). At that 
time, several ASEAN member countries still experienced rapid economic growth. 
Some even pursued a policy of import substitution. ASEAN members at that time 
overlooked the possibilities for trade integration and economic cooperation in the 
region.  
The need for deeper regional economic cooperation came in the late 1980s 
when the global economic environment had dramatically changed. The IMF and the 
World Bank’s efforts to accelerate trade liberalization put pressure on ASEAN 
countries to further liberalize trade. The region also sought to counterbalance not only 
the upward influence of NAFTA and the EU as the main export destinations, but also 
the emergence of China as a major supplier and FDI destination. Furthermore, the 
reduction of political tensions in the region (e.g., the Vietnam War, the Unification of 
Vietnam, and the invasion of Cambodia) allowed ASEAN members to pay more 
attention to economic collaboration (Naya, 2004). As a result, the 6 ASEAN members 
agreed in January 1992 to implement the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) scheme as the framework for the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). This 
agreement would act as a goal to boost competitive advantage within ASEAN 
through the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers and to attract more FDI into 
the region. 
The signing of the AFTA agreement in 1992 clearly reflects ASEAN 
members’ efforts to carry out deeper trade integration in the region. Unlike the 
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ASEAN PTA’s framework, the agreement on the CEPT scheme for AFTA consisted 
of all manufactured products including capital products and processed agricultural 
products, while raw agricultural products were not subject to the tariff reduction 
schedule.
15
 Products that originate within ASEAN of at least 40 percent value added 
were also subject to the program for tariff reduction, and the tariff of these products 
had to be reduced to 0-5 percent by 2010, according to the ASEAN Secretariat, 2002.  
Although the members also agreed to remove all quantitative restrictions and 
other non-tariff barriers, several practical shortcomings have been identified. For 
instance, the elimination of indefensible non-tariff measures (NTMs) has met with 
little progress although it was subject to high priority (Cuyvers et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, only 5 percent of intra-ASEAN trade has actually benefited from the 
CEPT scheme due to difficult rules regarding country of origin (Reyes, 2004). 
 Indeed, the existing literature identified the aftermath of the East Asian 
financial crises in the late 1990s as the key trigger for the rise of economic integration 
in the region (Cuyvers et al., 2005, Naya, 2004, and Elliott and Ikemoto, 2004). Back 
in the early 1990s, the ASEAN members participated in two major RTAs: AFTA and 
APEC. While the arrangement under AFTA aims to promote intra-regional trade and 
attract FDI into the region on the one hand, on the other hand ASEAN countries also 
took part in the APEC initiative as another way to encourage international trade and 
transnational cooperation. However, unlike the systematic integration in the context 
of the EU or NATFA, the APEC framework intends to liberalize trade and investment 
among member countries based upon individual voluntary effort. Consequently, when 
                                                             
15 See further discussion in ―Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme for the 
ASEAN Free Trade Area, Singapore, 28 January 1992.‖ www.aseansec.org 
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the financial crises hit East Asian countries in 1997 and 1998, APEC was unable to 
manage the crises and contagion. Nor had it provided enough support for the crisis-hit 
member states since its framework centers on the real side of the economy, not on 
financial cooperation. It has also been argued that the failure of the IMF and the US 
in dealing with the crises served as a wake-up call for serious economic integration in 
the region (Naya, 2004). Although East Asian countries have been pursuing export-
oriented strategies, they have realized that the crisis and panic from Thailand could 
spread throughout the region as contagion. This condition of economic 
interdependence together with the failure of international institutions in managing the 
crisis caused the East Asian countries to turn their attention back to intra-regional 
integration in the form of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN +3 
frameworks in parallel. 
 
2.3 Economics of Regionalism in Southeast Asia 
It is likely that the recent arrangement of the AEC adopted in 2003 will play a 
major role in transforming Southeast Asia into a single market and production base. 
In response to the proliferation of RTAs in other regions, especially NATFA and the 
EU, trade and investment liberalization under the AEC blueprint will be much 
broader and deeper than those in the context of AFTA and ASEAN Investment Area 
(AIA) combined. In particular, the whole ASEAN economy shall be seen as an 
integrated area of free movement of goods, service, investment, skilled labor, and 
 
 
15 
 
capital by 2015.
16
 This development, on the one hand, will be beneficial to all 
member states by allowing them to fully exploit their comparative advantages and 
economies of scale. Given that ASEAN states have different resource endowments, 
the progress under the AEC framework will also allow its members to concentrate in 
specializing in the production of certain goods or tasks. On the other hand, the 
structure of an ASEAN single market and production base per se could represent a 
significant building block towards global free trade.  
Ever since the AFTA was launched in the early 1990s, there has been an 
ongoing debate over the economic implication of the ASEAN community: whether it 
has actually benefited member states without damaging trade and welfare of non-
members. In theory, the removal of trade barriers between member countries usually 
results in an immediate shift of import structure in favor of RTA partners’ products, 
whereas the welfare effects of forming a trading bloc are ambiguous. That is, the 
establishment of RTAs usually brings about the elimination of market imperfections 
or distortions (e.g., tariffs and quotas) within the bloc that can improve members’ 
economic efficiency and welfare. In turn, the simultaneous reflection of RTAs is the 
creation of other distortions against non-member states (e.g., relatively higher 
external tariff rates) which worsen the economic welfare of non-member states. 
In the well-known analysis of Viner (1950), the welfare implication of a 
customs union (CU) was demonstrated to be either good or bad depending upon 
individual circumstances. For instance, the removal of customs duties between CU 
member countries can enhance economic efficiency of resource allocation if the 
                                                             
16 In fact, the ASEAN Community is consisted of three pillars: the ASEAN Economic Community 
(AEC), the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). 
In dealing with the economic integration, this study, however, centers on the AEC only.  
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imports of goods produced by high-cost producers outside the CU are substituted by 
lower-cost products produced within the CU member states. Of course, inefficient 
resource allocation can also arise as the imports of goods are shifted away from low-
cost products made outside the CU to higher-cost products produced by the CU 
member countries. 
Aside from the shift of import structure that can alter resource allocation when 
tariffs are removed, the economics of customs unions also points to the importance of 
factor mobility within the CU as it may or may not lead to welfare improvement. In 
general, the formation of a CU (or RTA) usually leads to a higher degree of market 
integration that enables firms or industries within the integrated market to exploit 
product specialization and scale economies. It is true that the net welfare of member 
states can be improved if those firms or industries’ production functions exhibit 
increasing returns to scale. Nonetheless, once the production functions of those 
manufacturers have already reached the optimal scale of production, other things 
constant, further production expansion would lead to decreasing returns to scale 
unless the free movement of factors of production between members is allowed so 
that resources can be efficiently relocated. 
In addition, most economic analyses of RTAs have recognized the 
significance of RTA formation as a way to improve members’ terms of trade. This 
benefit of RTAs arises when an integrated community is large enough to influence 
world prices. The improvement of production processes as a result of scale 
economies, elimination of market distortions and more efficient resource allocation 
drives down costs and prices of members’ products. In effect, this would increase the 
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quantity demanded for member products but simultaneously reduce the demand for 
non-member products. After all, members’ terms of trade will improve, whereas that 
of non-members is worsened. 
Indeed, the economics of regionalism also suggests a number of factors that 
can influence the impact of RTA formation. For example, it is straightforward that the 
establishment of RTAs can lead to large trade creation when high-level trade barriers 
initially imposed are removed. In the familiar notion of natural trading partners, 
geographical proximity can also play a significant role in generating intra-regional 
trade, especially when transaction costs between them are low. Besides, existing 
literature suggests that trade creation will be large when member states of RTAs have 
similar levels of development (e.g., similar technology), and when a large RTA is 
formed. This is because the integrated economic community seems to provide more 
opportunity for each member to stay focused on outsourcing manufacturing in the 
region. In turn, the impact of RTAs on trade diversion is likely to be small if RTA 
members initially have low levels of trade with non-members. 
In spite of the fact that trade and welfare effects of RTAs can vary widely 
depending upon numerous factors, the general understanding appears to be that the 
formation of RTAs tends to be an immediately trade-creating and welfare-enhancing 
among member states at the expense of non-members. Yet, as highlighted by 
Lawrence (1996), the negative impacts on non-members could be improved since the 
economic growth effect of RTA members can counterbalance the initial trade 
diversion effect. In other words, the economic growth results from RTA formation 
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can stimulate demand for non-members’ products and may offset the initial trade 
diversion in the long run. 
In line with these underlying rules, existing empirical findings have exhibited 
mixed results for AFTA’s impact on trade. To begin with, Thornton and Goglio 
(2002) showed that while ASEAN trade liberalization in the late 1980s led to trade 
creation, a modest bias towards intra-regional trade was found. In addition, Elliott and 
Ikemoto’s (2004) result highlighted the AFTA arrangement and the recent East Asian 
financial crisis as having a leading role in spurring intra-regional trade. 
In contrast, by using extreme bounds analysis, Ghosh and Yamarik (2004) 
have shown that the ASEAN arrangement (and most RTAs) could exhibit either trade 
creation or trade diversion depending upon ―the unacknowledged beliefs of the 
researchers‖ rather than ―the information content of the data‖ (p. 387). Interestingly, 
Dee and Gali (2003) have argued that ignorance of country-specific shocks in 
assessing the impact of PTA formation on international trade can lead to an upward 
bias. As a result, they have demonstrated that once the specific fixed effects are 
controlled for, the coefficient of AFTA (and most PTAs) actually exhibit negative 
trade creation instead of positive.  
 
2.4 Methodology and Variables 
2.4.1 The Gravity Model of International Trade 
Ever since the introduction of trade creation and diversion effects resulting 
from a customs union, existing empirical analyses have continually utilized either the 
general equilibrium model or the gravity model of trade to measure the economic 
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impacts of RTA formation on trade flows and welfare implications.
17
 The difference 
between the two methods is that the general equilibrium model (also referred to as 
computable general equilibrium-CGE-model) is employed to provide an ex ante 
simulation of the economic impacts of RTA formation. The gravity model, in 
contrast, is utilized to provide an ex post investigation of the effects of RTA 
arrangement, especially on trade flows.  
The so-called gravity model, which is the focus of this study, has been one of 
the most successful in explaining the pattern of bilateral trade despite the fact that its 
theoretical bases were less clear cut in the past. More recently, however, the 
theoretical justification of the model has been resolved by deriving the gravity 
equation from several different foundations, including increasing returns to scale 
(IRS) model, Ricardian models, Armington models, and Hechsher-Ohlin (H-O) 
models.
18
 As has been argued several times, the achievement of the model has 
emerged from the fact that it has consistently predicted bilateral trade flows as a 
positive function of economic size and a negative function of distance between them. 
In this section, it would be more insightful to begin with ―the standard gravity 
equation‖ following Deardorff’s phrase as follows: 
      
    
   
 ,         (2.1) 
where     is the value of exports of country i to country j, Yi and Yj are national 
incomes of i and j, respectively,    is the distance between them, and A is constant. 
                                                             
17 Further discussion of comparison of the gravity and CGE models can be seen in Gilbert et al. (2001) 
and Piermartini and Teh (2005). 
18 See, for instance, Deardorff (1995), Evenett and Keller (1998), and Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 
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Nonetheless, unlike Newton’s gravity law in physics, equation (2.1) will not 
predict the bilateral trade precisely since in economics, international trade is usually 
assumed to be stochastic. Thus, the stochastic version of the gravity equation has the 
following double-log form as: 
       ) =    +             +              +               +     , (2.2) 
where       and       denote national incomes of i and j, respectively,        is the 
distance between them and      represents an error term with 
                            
Without any extension of the standard gravity model, it is hard to believe that 
the volume of bilateral trade can be entirely explained completely by economic 
―mass‖ (read ―national income‖ following Rose, 2000) and distance. Other factors 
beyond these two explanatory variables must be taken into account although these 
factors are not a subject of interest. In general, these variables include colonization, 
common official language, contiguity, landlocked countries, and island countries. So 
equation (2.2) is augmented as follows: 
        ) =    +             +              +              + 
         
 
           +              +            +            + 
         
 
            +                  +                + 
         
  
            + ∑    
        
   + ∑   
       
   +     , (2.3) 
where i and j denote importing and exporting country, respectively, while the other 
variables are defined as: 
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     is the value of imports of country i from country j
19
, 
       is per capita GDP of country i, 
        is a binary variable equal to unity if i and j share a land border and 
zero otherwise, 
        is a binary variable equal to unity if i and j have a common official 
language and zero otherwise, 
          is the difference in per capita GDP between country i and country 
j
20
, 
              is the number of landlocked countries (0/1/2), 
           is the number of island countries (0/1/2), 
          is a binary variable equal to unity if i colonizes j at time t (or vice 
versa) and zero otherwise, 
      
  is a binary variable of trade creation equal to unity if i and j belong to 
regional trade agreement   and zero otherwise, 
     
  is a binary variable of trade diversion equal to unity if only i or j is a 
member of regional trade agreement   and zero otherwise. 
 
2.4.2 Data  
In order to conduct the hypothesis tests, this study first obtains the new dataset 
on bilateral trade by commodity from Robert C. Feenstra’s homepage.21 As illustrated 
                                                             
19 Notice that in equation (2.3) the value of imports is employed as dependent variable instead of the 
value of exports like equation (2.2). Explanation will be discussed in the next section. 
20 Mathematically,          = (         –         )
2 following Arnon and Weinblatt (1998)’s term.  
21 http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu 
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in Feenstra et al. (2005), the original version of this dataset (also referred to as 
―NBER-UN dataset‖) is constructed from the United Nations trade data, and 
organized by a 4-digit Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), revision 2 
so as to fit the Canadian trade classification. However, while the original NBER-UN 
dataset is based on exporting country reports, the new version is primarily derived 
from importing country reports, and additional country-pair bilateral trade by 
commodity (e.g., exports from China and Hong Kong) are also available for years 
1962-2000.  
Next, this study follows the methodology of Rauch (1999) and Feenstra, 
Markusen, and Rose (2001) by summing each country’s bilateral imports by 
commodity into three possible categories: homogeneous, reference-priced, and 
differentiated products, based on Rauch’s ―conservative‖ classification of goods.22 As 
described in Rauch (1999), commodities that trade in an organized exchange (i.e., 
goods that can be seen in International Commodity Markets Handbook and The 
Knight-Ridder CRB Commodity Yearbook) are classified as ―homogeneous‖ products. 
Commodities whose prices are quoted in trade journals (i.e., Chemical Marketing 
Reporter) are classified as ―reference-priced‖ products. And commodities that neither 
have quoted prices nor trade in organized exchanges are considered as 
―differentiated‖ products.23 These three categories of bilateral imports, deflated by the 
                                                             
22 In fact, Rauch (1999) has launched two versions of classification of goods: conservative and liberal 
classifications. The former version minimizes the number of homogeneous and reference-priced 
products that remain unclear, while the latter version maximizes these numbers. Nonetheless, this 
study believes that by applying a conservative scheme, empirical measurement for each category 
should be more accurate. 
23 One example of homogeneous products is coffee, not roasted (SITC 0711). Acyclic hydrocarbons 
(SITC 5111) is an example of reference-priced products, whereas examples of differentiated products 
include electric rotary converters (SITC 7164) and sports footwear (SITC 8512). Further discussion 
about the theoretical motivation for these three possible categories can be seen in Rauch (1999). 
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US GDP deflator, obtained from the IFS (using 2005 as the base year), will be 
utilized as the dependent variable in equation (2.3). 
Real GDP per capita is obtained from the Penn World Table 6.3.
24
 For real 
GDP data, since the Penn World Table does not provide this dataset, real GDP is 
computed by multiplying real GDP per capita by population obtained from the same 
source. The geographical distance between two countries is drawn from ―the Great 
circle distances between capital cities” and Andrew K. Rose’s home page. This study 
also exploits Andrew K. Rose’s home page for country-specific binary variables 
including contiguous neighbors, landlocked countries, islands countries, colony, and 
official language. Information on preferential trading arrangements is obtained from 
Eicher, Henn, and Papageorgiou (2008) to construct the     and    variables (see 
Appendix Table A2.1). 
By exploiting available data from these sources, a comprehensive set of panel 
data comprises 155 countries between 1983 and 2000. The list of countries is 
tabulated in Appendix Table A2.2. Because equation (2.3) is estimated using 
         ) as the dependent variable, the  dataset then consists of 174,095 annual 
observations of bilateral imports for all types of categories equally. Given the period 
of study, it permits the author to make a comparison between the coefficients 
estimated in this chapter and Elliott and Ikemoto (2004)’s results. Nonetheless, it 
should be emphasized here that the difference between the two studies is clear; while 
they employ bilateral import and export data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade 
Statistics as dependent variable, this study utilizes bilateral imports ―by commodity‖ 
                                                             
24 Indeed, the benefit of using this dataset is the fact that the Penn World Table provides data for 
Cambodia and Vietnam, while the World Development Indicator (WDI) does not. 
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from NBER-UN dataset. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2.1 which shows 
that the means and standard deviations for all types of categories are about the same 
size. 
At this point, two limitations of methodology and data are worth discussing. 
The first drawback is due to the country coding of NBER-UN dataset. Because both 
Bhutan and Brunei Darussalam, as documented in Feenstra et al. (2005), are grouped 
together as ―Asia NES‖, it is impossible to separate Brunei Darussalam’s imports 
from the imports of Bhutan.
25
 To avoid possible bias when assessing trade creation 
and trade diversion effects of ASEAN, this study needs to rule out Brunei Darussalam 
although the state is an ASEAN member. 
Another shortcoming concerns potential bias in the estimated coefficients for 
the trade creation and trade diversion effects of PTAs. Due to the global proliferation 
of PTAs, it seems quite tedious to include all PTA ties in the model. Thus, the 
selected PTAs are included, whereas bilateral PTAs and some other PTAs are omitted 
for parsimony. Although this methodology could result in bias, this study follows 
existing studies by assuming that such possible bias tends to be small since the major 
PTAs between the main trading partners (in term of trade volume) are taken into 
account in the model properly.
26
 
 
2.4.3 Econometric Methods and the Underlying Assumptions 
Equation (2.3) is first estimated by OLS using robust standard errors 
(clustered by country-pair dyads). Yet, in the context of the gravity model of trade, 
                                                             
25 NES: Not Elsewhere Specified. 
26 For further discussion, see Elliott and Ikemoto (2004) and Gilbert et al. (2001), for example. 
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log-linear OLS estimation yields biased estimates due to multilateral resistance and 
unobserved bilateral heterogeneity, three alternative econometric techniques are also 
employed in this chapter. First, a set of year-specific fixed effects is added to absorb 
any shock that is common to all country pairs but specific to a particular year. 
Second, a set of country-pair fixed effects is included to control for country-pair 
characteristics that are specific to each pair of countries but constant over the period 
of study (i.e., distance, sharing a border or a common language, and any unobserved 
cultural ties). Third, another way to deal with the problem is to incorporate a set of 
country-specific fixed effects to absorb any time-invariant country-specific factor that 
influences bilateral trade flows.
27
 
As a general rule, this study hypothesizes that bilateral trade between a pair of 
countries is positively related to their GDP but negatively related to the distance 
between them. Geographic contiguity is expected to be positively correlated with 
bilateral trade flows since sharing a land border tends to assist trade. For similar 
reasons, the coefficients on common language and colony are anticipated to be 
positive, while being a landlocked or an island country is expected to obstruct trade. 
Nonetheless, unlike the expected coefficients for importer and exporter GDP 
that are clearly positive, the expected signs of per capita GDP coefficients are less 
clear since the effect of population size is indeterminate. Put differently, despite the 
fact that a growing economy in either the importing or exporting country tends to spur 
                                                             
27 Indeed, another method in dealing with multilateral resistance terms is to include a set of exporter-
year and importer-year fixed effects together with a set of country-pair fixed effects in the model to 
absorb as many factors as possible. Nonetheless, since this technique does not allow the estimation of 
trade creation and trade diversion effects simultaneously, so it is not utilized in this chapter (see 
discussion about this issue in Magee, 2008).    
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trade, population size can theoretically play a role in either creating or damaging 
trade, depending on whether absorption effect dominates the effect of scale 
economies or vice versa (Martinez-Zarzoso, 2003). The absorption effect is an 
economic phenomenon when a large country relies less on international trade since a 
large population tends to provide vast essential resource endowments and potential 
domestic markets for self sufficiency. In turn, a larger economy means more 
opportunities for scale economies and product specialization that allows domestic 
firms to produce lower-cost products and more varied goods for markets worldwide. 
In spite of these theoretical ambiguities, this study follows a number of existing 
literatures by hypothesizing a positive relation between per capita income and the 
volume of bilateral trade. 
 
The Linder hypothesis 
Ever since the appearance of Linder’s conjecture in 1961, economists have 
long been aware of the positive correlation between similar demand structures (e.g., 
taste indifferences) and the volume of bilateral trade. Indeed, empirical studies have 
generally found consistent evidence to support the Linder hypothesis from several 
different perspectives. Arnon and Weinblatt (1998), for instance, have found evidence 
of the Linder hypothesis for both developed and less developed countries. Choi 
(2002) found that the Linder effect did exist in international trade among 63 countries 
and further argued that the global proliferation of RTAs might actually reinforce the 
Linder hypothesis. 
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Nevertheless, due to the lack of evidence for APT countries, this chapter 
attempts to re-estimate the existence of the Linder effect both on international trade 
generally and from the perspective of APT countries in particular using the new 
NBER-UN dataset. And because similarity of demand structures is unobservable 
directly, the difference between two countries’ per capita income           will be 
employed as a proxy for similarity of preferences. Of course, a negative coefficient 
on the Linder variable will indicate the validity of the Linder hypothesis. 
 
The home market effect 
Because firms seek to maximize profit by exploiting economies of scale in 
production and minimizing transaction costs, so it is rational for them to choose a 
location to produce goods in a country with the largest domestic market for their 
products. Under such circumstance, the ―home market effect‖ predicts, according to 
Krugman (1980), that ―countries will tend to export those kinds of products for which 
they have relatively large domestic demand‖ (p.955). 
In order to assess the nature of the home market effect across commodities, 
this study applies the methodology of Feenstra, Markusen, and Rose (2001) who 
provide a testable hypothesis to test the home market effect through the coefficients 
of importing and exporting countries’ GDPs in the gravity equation. In the presence 
of the home market effect, the coefficient of the exporting country’s GDP in equation 
(2.3) should be greater than that of the importing country. In turn, the home market 
effect is reversed if the income elasticity of exporting country is lower than that of 
importing country. 
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Trade creation and trade diversion 
As shown in equation 2.3, the impact of regional trade integration on intra-
regional trade can be empirically assessed by introducing ―   ‖ as a binary variable. 
As a general rule, a positive coefficient will indicate that the regional trading bloc has 
actually benefited its member states by generating more intra-regional trade among 
members. In the same way, the dummy variable ―  ‖ is incorporated into the model 
to capture whether the formation of regional trading blocs have diverted trade away 
from non-member countries. Of course, a negative sign is said to be trade diverting. 
It is worth noting that in spite of the fact that previous empirical studies have 
highlighted the role of ASEAN integration (especially AFTA) in generating intra-
regional trade without damaging non-members, it does not mean the expected 
coefficients in this study will be consistent with them. This is simply because, as 
noted earlier, a different trade dataset is employed; while previous studies employ 
bilateral imports or exports as dependent variable, this study goes a step deeper by 
utilizing bilateral imports by commodity. Accordingly, it leads this study to 
hypothesize that the expected coefficients of     and    for each type of 
commodity remain unclear.  
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
Tables 2.2 through 2.4 report the empirical results for differentiated, 
reference-priced, and homogeneous products, respectively. The second column of 
each table presents the estimated results using the OLS estimation technique, the third 
column reports the results using year-fixed effects, while column 4 and 5 extend the 
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model from column 3 by adding country-pair fixed effects and country-specific fixed 
effects, respectively. 
As seen in Table 2.2 through 2.4, the augmented gravity model fits the data 
relatively well in explaining more than half of the variation in bilateral trade in 
differentiated products. Interestingly, the fit of the model reduces steadily as it moves 
from differentiated to homogeneous products. Namely, slightly less than half of the 
variation in bilateral trade in reference-priced products can be captured by the model 
while the ability of the model in explaining bilateral trade variation decreases to about 
one-third in the case of homogeneous products.  
The estimated coefficients on the traditional gravity variables in general are 
economically and statistically significant as expected, regardless of the econometric 
techniques. To summarize briefly, the estimated coefficients on the log of importer 
and exporter’s GDP as well as their per capita GDP are positively significant in most 
cases, implying that economically larger and richer economies tend to trade more. 
Interestingly, some of the estimated signs on these variables turn negative when 
controlling for country-pair characteristics or country-specific factors (column 4 and 
5). Moreover, in line with its theoretical justification, the empirical evidence also 
appears to suggest that geographical distance plays a significant role as a trade 
deterrent. 
When controlling for the influence of sharing a common language(s) on 
bilateral trade flows, it turns out that the empirical evidence robustly supports the 
hypothesis; the estimated coefficients on the common language variable are positively 
significant at the 1 % level in all cases. Specifically, according to the tables, countries 
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that share a common official language(s) trade between 53.7 % and 124.7% more 
than other pairs.
28
 Likewise, the estimated results demonstrate that sharing a border 
and a common colonial history increase bilateral trade between 53.7% and 228.7%, 
more than other pairs in the former case and 256.1% and 492.9% in the latter case. 
The evidence also points to the empirical fact that, ceteris paribus, being an island 
country actually assists (not deters) international trade considerably, while being a 
landlocked country plays a role as trade deterrent.
29
  
 
 The Linder hypothesis 
When controlling for country-pair characteristics or country-specific factors to 
absorb unobserved bilateral heterogeneity or multilateral resistance terms, the results 
on the Linder variable, reported in the last two columns of Table 2.2 through 2.4, 
generally support the validity of the proposition. The negative and significant 
coefficients indicate that, other things constant, the closer the per capita income 
between a pair of countries, the larger the volume of bilateral trade between them. As 
can be seen, the magnitudes of the effect vary not only across product types, but also 
with estimation technique. For example, given that the estimated coefficient for 
differentiated products using country-pair fixed effects is -0.03, the magnitude of the 
Linder effect is around -3.05%. By using country-specific fixed effects, the size of the 
effect decreases to -2.02%. This implies that a 1% reduction in per capita income 
inequality between a pair of countries, on average, causes the volume of bilateral 
                                                             
28 For instance, given that the estimated coefficient on common language for homogeneous products in 
column 2 is 0.81, so e0.81 = 2.2479. Thus, an increase from 0 to 1 (or in other words, from no common 
language to sharing a common language) raises bilateral trade flows by 124.7% ((2.2479-1)*100%). 
29 It should be noted that, like the case of GDP and per capita GDP, when controlling for country-
specific characteristics, the estimated coefficients have an opposite sign in some cases. 
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imports in differentiated products to increase by between 2.02% and 3.05%, 
depending on the estimation method. 
Notice that the empirical results provide strong support for the Linder 
hypothesis in the case of differentiated products, as the estimated coefficients remain 
statistically significant for both estimation techniques. In contrast, the results merely 
reveal mixed evidence for the proposition in the case of reference-priced and 
homogeneous products as two-fourths of the estimated coefficients lose significance 
or even show up with an incorrect sign. 
The empirical finding is consistent with the result of the theory that asserts 
that the level of statistical significance of the Linder effect should decline as it moves 
away from differentiated and towards homogeneous products. This circumstance can 
be systematically explained through the quality of production and demand (Hallak, 
2006). Namely, among differentiated goods, richer countries tend to produce 
relatively high-quality products, while low-quality products are manufactured in low-
income countries. To enable a country to produce high-quality products, it seems that 
the import of high-quality intermediate goods is required, and the opposite holds true 
for the case of low-quality products. After all, it is the similarity of income that drives 
trade in differentiated products. In contrast, the production of homogeneous products 
tends to rely heavily on the quality and abundance of natural resources, which is 
unrelated to per capita income. On the demand side, if the preference of rich countries 
is to consume high-quality products and the opposite holds true for low-income 
countries, it seems plausible that rich countries tend to trade more with one another 
and so do low-income countries.  
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The home market effect 
Now consider the nature of the home market effect. The first point to notice is 
that the estimated coefficients on exporter and importer GDP, reported in column 2 of 
Table 2.2 through 2.4, vary systematically across product categories. In moving away 
from differentiated and toward homogeneous products, it turns out that the 
coefficients on exporter GDP continue to decrease while the estimates on importer 
GDP increase steadily. In the case of differentiated products, for example, the 
estimated coefficient on exporter GDP is around 1.32, whereas the estimate on 
importer GDP is only 0.70. The estimated coefficient on exporter GDP drops slightly 
to 1.11, while the coefficient on importer GDP increases to 0.98 for reference-priced 
products. Although the estimated coefficient on exporter GDP is still above unity for 
the case of homogeneous products, it turns out that the coefficient on importer GDP 
goes above unity and becomes greater than the estimated coefficient of exporter GDP 
(1.04 and 1.01, respectively – not significantly different from 1.0). Observe also that 
the empirical finding in this study is consistent with the theoretical prediction about 
the nature of the effects; i.e., that the home market effect exists in the case of 
differentiated and reference-priced products while the effect is reversed for 
homogeneous products.  
As suggested by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), the omission of the 
multilateral resistance terms (as in column 2) can lead to biased estimation. To check, 
this study takes into account these terms by using three different techniques (as 
explained in the previous section). The key findings are as follows: When controlling 
for country-pair characteristics or country-specific factors, about one-third of the 
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estimated coefficients on exporter and importer GDP lose significance and the 
magnitude vary more dramatically. Nevertheless, this study finds no difference in the 
nature of the home market effect between estimation techniques; the occurrence of 
the home market effect still depends on the type of commodities. 
 
Trade creation and trade diversion 
With regards to trade creation and trade diversion, consider first the estimated 
effects of the European Union (EU) on bilateral trade flows. When using OLS to 
estimate the EU coefficients, the results, reported in column 2 of Table 2.2 through 
2.4, show that intra-EU trade flows are estimated to increase by 256 %, 103%, and 
431% for differentiated, reference-priced, and homogeneous products, respectively. 
The significant positive coefficients on the EU countries’ trade diversion indicate that 
the formation of the European Union did not divert trade from non-member states for 
any type of commodities. Nonetheless, as country-pair or country-specific fixed 
effects are controlled for, the estimated coefficients on the EU countries’ trade 
creation and trade diversion variables decline sharply or even lose significance in 
many cases. Using differentiated products as an example, the estimated OLS 
coefficient of 1.27 is statistically significant at the 1 % level. Yet, when country-pair 
fixed effects are controlled for, the EU coefficient turns negative (-0.11) and becomes 
insignificant. As country-specific fixed effects are included, the EU coefficient drops 
to -1.30 at the 1% significance level. This evidence reinforces the idea that the 
ignorance of multilateral resistance terms or unobserved bilateral heterogeneity tends 
to result in an upward bias, especially when assessing the impacts of trading blocs on 
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trade flows (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; and 
Magee, 2008). In addition, another point to notice is that, among the product types, 
there is strong evidence of trade diversion in the case of reference-priced products, 
but the magnitudes of the effect are only mild and range between 18.5 % and 39.1%, 
depending on the estimation technique.  
As seen, one of the clearest pieces of evidence of trade creation is in the 
MERCOSUR framework. Observe that even controlling for country-pair or country-
specific fixed effects, the estimated coefficients still remain positively significant for 
any type of product. In terms of magnitude, the results illustrate that the formation of 
the Common Market of the South has generated massive intra-regional trade among 
its members. Specifically, the estimated coefficients for differentiated products range 
between 0.37 and 2.13. For reference-priced and homogeneous products, the effect 
values are between 0.59 and 1.85, and 0.77 and 1.49, respectively. And more 
importantly, the results indicate that the massive trade creation in the region did not 
divert trade away from the rest of the world for any type of products as the estimated 
coefficients on trade diversion variable are all positively significant. 
In short, no strong evidence of trade creation is found in the case of APEC and 
NAFTA, except for trade in homogeneous products within APEC. Observe that the 
estimated coefficients on intra-NAFTA trade in the case of reference-priced and 
homogeneous products even turn negative at the 5% level of significance when 
country-specific characteristics are controlled for. In addition, the significant negative 
coefficients on extra-regional trade bias of NAFTA provide a clear-cut result of trade 
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diversion for homogeneous products, while there is no evidence that the formation of 
APEC has actually diverted trade away from the rest of the world. 
Now consider the impact of ASEAN integration on bilateral trade flows. The 
empirical result reveals that ASEAN trade liberalization under the ASEAN PTA and 
AFTA frameworks has played a large role in promoting intra-ASEAN trade. To 
summarize briefly, in the case of differentiated products, the estimated coefficients of 
0.44 and 1.79 indicate that being a member of ASEAN has raised intra-ASEAN trade 
in differentiated products by between 55.3% and 498.9%. Similarly, the results show 
that regional trading arrangements in the region have increased intra-regional trade in 
reference-priced products between 235.3% and 285.7%. In the case of homogeneous 
products, the estimated coefficient is significant only when country-pair fixed effects 
are controlled for. The estimate shows that bilateral trade flows in these products are 
estimated to increase by 897.4 %. Even more interestingly, although regional trading 
arrangements in Southeast Asia have generated a sharp increase in intra-ASEAN 
trade for all product types, the findings reveal that the ASEAN trading bloc did not 
divert trade away from the rest of the world.  
Two issues are worth discussing here. First, the robustly positive and 
significant coefficients on the trade diversion variable need not mean that there has 
been no trade-diverting effect at all in the case of ASEAN. Instead, the positive 
coefficients imply that the diversion effects have actually been offset by a massive 
increase in imports from non-ASEAN countries. Second, the results of this study 
reveal that the formation of ASEAN has played a role in promoting intra-regional 
trade differently across products. As seen, strong evidence of trade creation is found 
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only in the case of differentiated and reference-priced products. This truly reflects the 
fact that the implementation of tariff reductions under the AFTA framework has 
covered all manufactured products (differentiated and reference-priced products) 
while agricultural raw materials and unprocessed products (homogeneous goods) 
have usually been subjected to ―a waiver of any concession‖.30 
 
Revisiting East Asian regionalism: A closer look 
Now let’s concentrate on the ASEAN plus three (APT) countries. The first 
point to notice from Table 2.5 is that the insignificance of the exporter’s and 
importer’s GDP coefficients makes it difficult to examine the nature of the home 
market effect in the region. Even though the result using OLS is consistent with the 
nature of the home market effect, the only strong evidence of a reverse home-market 
effect is found in the case of reference-priced products when fixed effects are 
controlled for. Observe also that the estimated coefficients on the Linder variables 
become insignificant or even turn positive in most cases. This means that there is no 
relationship between the similarity of demand structures and the pattern of trade 
among APT countries.  
In contrast to the results of the previous section, the PTAs do not appear to 
have had a significant effect on intra-regional trade expansion among APT countries 
for all types of commodities.
31
 This empirical finding has two complementary 
implications. First, it indicates that ASEAN’s effort to carry out deeper trade 
integration within the Southeast Asian region has played a limited role in redirecting 
                                                             
30 For ASEAN’s schedule for tariff reductions, see ―ASEAN secretariat‖ or http://www.aseansec.org/. 
31 Note that the PTA variable in Table 2.5 includes ASEAN and APEC. 
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trade away from East Asian countries (i.e., China, Japan, and South Korea) and 
toward ASEAN member states. Second, despite the fact that ASEAN countries have 
paid more attention to the larger markets in East Asian countries rather than the 
smaller economies in Southeast Asia, trade liberalization under the APEC framework 
had only a limited impact on intra-regional trade expansion since its framework 
merely intends to liberalize trade among members based upon individual voluntary 
effort. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
For more than three decades, ASEAN has made remarkable progress on trade 
liberalization. Intra-regional trade has increased considerably in terms of both value 
and as a percentage share of total trade. Nevertheless, even if existing empirical 
studies have highlighted the importance of ASEAN trade liberalization in generating 
a massive increase in intra-regional trade, no research has attempted to assess its 
impact on bilateral trade flows at the product level. This chapter, therefore, tries to 
close the gap by employing the gravity model to measure the magnitude of trade 
creation and trade diversion at the product level. The focus of the analysis is also on 
the roles of the home market effect and the Linder effect in the patterns of trade, 
centering both on global trade and from the perspective of APT countries in 
particular. 
The findings in this chapter provide a great deal of useful information. First, 
there is strong evidence that trade liberalization under the ASEAN PTA and AFTA 
frameworks appears to have had a major impact on the expansion of intra-regional 
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trade in differentiated and reference-priced products. In turn, the results reveal only 
weak evidence of trade creation in homogeneous products which reflects the fact that 
the implementation of the tariff reduction has provided limited benefits to its member 
states due to ―a waiver of any concession.‖ Second, although ASEAN has been 
successful in both widening and deepening economic collaboration in the region, the 
results robustly suggest that the massive increase in intra-regional trade did not lead 
to trade diversion in all product types. Apparently, the presence of this phenomenon 
implies that the negative impacts on non-member states have been totally offset by 
the trade-creating effects resulting from the rapid economic growth in ASEAN 
countries. Third, the estimation results of re-running the gravity equation for APT 
countries indicate that trade liberalizations have played no role in promoting trade 
between APT economies in all product types. This reflects the fact that (1) trade 
liberalization under the APEC framework had only a limited impact on intra-regional 
trade expansion since its framework merely intends to liberalize trade among 
members based upon individual voluntary effort, and (2) during the 1980s, ASEAN 
countries overlooked the desire for trade integration and economic cooperation in the 
region due to rapid economic growth and import substitution policies (Cuyvers et al., 
2005; Naya, 2004). 
Furthermore, the findings appear to suggest that the home market effect varies 
systematically across product categories and the effects are found to exist in 
differentiated and reference-priced, but not in homogeneous products. And though the 
underlying nature of the home market effect remains unchanged when the gravity 
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equation is re-estimated for APT countries, the clear-cut result indicates that the 
effect in the region has existed robustly only in reference-priced products.  
Finally, the results in this chapter provide significant evidence to support, 
once again, the Linder hypothesis: bilateral trade in differentiated products tends to 
increase with the similarity of demand structure, while weak evidence of the Linder 
effect implies that the conjecture should not apply to homogeneous products. 
Nonetheless, the absence of evidence for APT countries indicates that per capita 
income inequality becomes less important in explaining the bilateral trade structure 
between APT countries. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log of bilateral trade in: 
     Differentiated products 174095 7.465898 4.208042 0 18.91376 
     Referenced-priced products 174095 6.730111 4.269952 0 17.57038 
     Homogeneous products 174095   5.487428 4.684872 0 17.26624 
Log of exporter’s GDP 164700    18.66341 1.880958 11.47511 23.1277 
Log of importer’s GDP 164372    18.50619 1.957503 11.47511 23.1277 
Log of exporter’s GDP per capita 164700    9.075011 1.08344 5.031514 11.02498 
Log of importer’s GDP per capita 164372 9.040404 1.111904 5.031514 11.02498 
Linder 155346 2.976356 3.593524 0 29.59527 
Log of distance 161417 8.178429 0.775534 3.684131 9.421514 
Common Border 161417 0.023858 0.152606 0 1 
Common Language 161417 0.179554 0.383816 0 1 
Landlocked 163607 0.232582 0.454404 0 2 
Islands 163607 0.253534 0.473749 0 2 
Colony 161417 0.026453 0.160479 0 1 
EU 174095 0.012556 0.11135 0 1 
APEC 174095 0.016784 0.128461 0 1 
MERCOSUR 174095 0.000574 0.02396 0 1 
NAFTA 174095 0.000316 0.017771 0 1 
ASEAN 174095 0.002717 0.052053 0 1 
EU_td 174095 0.151682 0.358713 0 1 
APEC_td 174095 0.112416 0.315878 0 1 
MERCOSUR_td 174095 0.016491 0.127354 0 1 
NAFTA_td 174095 0.026273 0.159947 0 1 
ASEAN_td 174095 0.053092 0.224217 0 1 
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Table 2.2: The Estimation of the Gravity Model for Differentiated Products 
Independent Variable: OLS Year-fixed 
effects 
Country-pair 
fixed effects 
Country-
specific 
fixed effects 
Log of exporter’s GDP 1.32*** 
(.01) 
1.34*** 
(0.01) 
2.31*** 
(0.18) 
1.67*** 
(0.18) 
Log of importer’s GDP 0.70*** 
(0.02) 
0.70*** 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.16) 
-0.50*** 
(0.18) 
Log of exporter’s GDP per capita 1.05*** 
(0.03) 
1.06*** 
(0.03) 
-0.88*** 
(0.18) 
-0.42** 
(0.18) 
Log of importer’s GDP per capita 0.52*** 
(0.03) 
0.52*** 
(0.03) 
1.14*** 
(0.16) 
1.54*** 
(0.17) 
Linder 0.10*** 
(0.01) 
0.10*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.02) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
Log of distance -1.25*** 
(0.03) 
-1.26*** 
(0.03) 
 -1.58*** 
(0.03) 
Common Border 0.77*** 
(0.14) 
0.76*** 
(0.14) 
 0.63*** 
(0.14) 
Common Language 0.47*** 
(0.06) 
0.47*** 
(0.06) 
 0.70*** 
(0.05) 
Landlocked -0.30*** 
(0.05) 
-0.28*** 
(0.05) 
 -1.72*** 
(0.38) 
Islands 0.54*** 
(0.06) 
0.53*** 
(0.06) 
 -4.45*** 
(1.21) 
Colony 1.73*** 
(0.11) 
1.71*** 
(0.12) 
 1.35*** 
(0.10) 
Intra-regional trade bias     
EU 1.27*** 
(0.10) 
1.28*** 
(0.10) 
-0.11 
(0.07) 
-1.30*** 
(0.14) 
APEC 1.59*** 
(0.10) 
1.70*** 
(0.10) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
0.59*** 
(0.09) 
MERCOSUR 2.09*** 
(0.26) 
2.18*** 
(0.26) 
0.37* 
(0.22) 
2.13*** 
(0.35) 
NAFTA -0.10 
(0.47) 
-0.16 
(0.48) 
0.26 
(0.24) 
-0.73 
(0.53) 
ASEAN 1.46*** 
(0.24) 
1.44*** 
(0.24) 
1.79*** 
(0.32) 
0.44* 
(0.25) 
Extra-regional trade bias     
EU_td 0.75*** 
(0.08) 
0.79*** 
(0.08) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
0.21*** 
(0.08) 
APEC_td 0.04 
(0.08) 
0.17** 
(0.08) 
0.17*** 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
MERCOSUR_td 0.17 
(0.15) 
0.28* 
(0.15) 
1.17*** 
(0.12) 
0.88*** 
(0.12) 
NAFTA_td 1.32*** 
(0.13) 
1.29*** 
(0.13) 
-0.02 
(0.10) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
ASEAN_td 0.10 
(0.12) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
0.58*** 
(0.18) 
0.77 *** 
(0.19) 
R2 0.52 0.52 0.84 0.69 
RMSE 2.9200 2.9138 1.7800 2.3606 
Dependent variable: log of real imports of differentiated products. In each case, Data covers 149,623 
observations. Intercepts are not reported and robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs dyads) 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% level significance, respectively. 
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Table 2.3: The Estimation of the Gravity Model for Reference-Priced Products 
Independent Variable: OLS Year-fixed 
effects 
Country-pair 
fixed effects 
Country-
specific fixed 
effects 
Log of exporter’s GDP 1.11*** 
(0.02) 
1.13*** 
(0.02) 
3.20*** 
(0.20) 
2.31*** 
(0.20) 
Log of importer’s GDP 0.98*** 
(0.02) 
0.97*** 
(0.02) 
1.02***  
(0.18) 
0.25 
(0.19) 
Log of exporter’s GDP per capita 0.77*** 
(0.03) 
0.79*** 
(0.03) 
-1.97*** 
(0.20) 
-1.29*** 
(0.20) 
Log of importer’s GDP per capita 0.39*** 
(0.03) 
0.39*** 
(0.03) 
0.12 
(0.18) 
0.71*** 
(0.19) 
Linder 0.05*** 
(0.01) 
0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04***  
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Log of distance -1.46*** 
(0.03) 
-1.49*** 
(0.03) 
 -1.89*** 
(0.03) 
Common Border 0.64*** 
(0.13) 
0.60*** 
(0.13) 
 0.19 
(0.14) 
Common Language 0.69*** 
(0.06) 
0.67*** 
(0.06) 
 0.65*** 
(0.06) 
Landlocked -1.10*** 
(0.05) 
-1.06*** 
(0.05) 
 0.30 
(0.52) 
Islands 0.47*** 
(0.06) 
0.45*** 
(0.06) 
 -1.08 
(1.29) 
Colony 1.44*** 
(0.13) 
1.39*** 
(0.13) 
 1.27*** 
(0.13) 
Intra-regional trade bias     
EU 0.71*** 
(0.10) 
0.77*** 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
-1.54*** 
(0.16) 
APEC 1.42*** 
(0.11) 
1.76*** 
(0.11) 
0.13 
(0.09) 
0.65*** 
(0.09) 
MERCOSUR 1.80*** 
(0.35) 
2.07*** 
(0.35) 
0.59*** 
(0.21) 
1.85*** 
(0.41) 
NAFTA -1.27*** 
(0.30) 
-1.37***  
(0.32) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
-0.78** 
(0.32) 
ASEAN 0.79*** 
(0.22) 
0.69*** 
(0.22) 
1.21*** 
(0.36) 
1.35*** 
(0.29) 
Extra-regional trade bias     
EU_td 0.39*** 
(0.08) 
0.50*** 
(0.08) 
-0.33*** 
(0.09) 
-0.17** 
(0.09) 
APEC_td 0.12  
(0.08) 
0.46*** 
(0.08) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.12** 
(0.06) 
MERCOSUR_td 0.06  
(0.14) 
0.36*** 
(0.14) 
1.05*** 
(0.14) 
0.82*** 
(0.14) 
NAFTA_td 0.00 
(0.14) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
0.27** 
(0.12) 
ASEAN_td 0.44*** 
(0.11) 
0.32*** 
(0.11) 
1.21*** 
(0.26) 
1.39*** 
(0.26) 
R2 0.46 0.47 0.80 0.59 
RMSE 3.1229 3.1044 2.0049 2.7107 
Dependent variable: log of real imports of reference-priced products. In each case, Data covers 
149,623 observations. Intercepts are not reported and robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs 
dyads) in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% level significance, respectively. 
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Table 2.4: The Estimation of the Gravity Model for Homogeneous Products 
Independent Variable: OLS Year-fixed 
effects 
Country-pair 
fixed effects 
Country-
specific fixed 
effects 
Log of exporter’s GDP 1.01*** 
(0.02) 
1.04*** 
(0.02) 
0.65*** 
(0.24) 
-0.21 
(0.23) 
Log of importer’s GDP 1.04*** 
(0.02) 
1.04*** 
(0.02) 
1.24***  
(0.21) 
0.32 
(0.20) 
Log of exporter’s GDP per capita -0.24*** 
(0.03) 
-0.22*** 
(0.03) 
-0.07 
(0.24) 
0.74*** 
(0.23) 
Log of importer’s GDP per capita 0.58*** 
(0.04) 
0.58*** 
(0.04) 
-0.61*** 
(0.21) 
0.39** 
(0.20) 
Linder 0.07*** 
(0.01) 
0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.09*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Log of distance -1.17*** 
(0.04) 
-1.22*** 
(0.04) 
 -1.84*** 
(0.04) 
Common Border 1.19*** 
(0.17) 
1.14*** 
(0.17) 
 0.43** 
(0.18) 
Common Language 0.81*** 
(0.08) 
0.77*** 
(0.08) 
 0.43*** 
(0.08) 
Landlocked -0.70*** 
(0.07) 
-0.65*** 
(0.07) 
 1.96*** 
(0.56) 
Islands 0.27*** 
(0.08) 
0.23*** 
(0.08) 
 -0.95 
(1.33) 
Colony 1.62*** 
(0.18) 
1.55*** 
(0.18) 
 1.78*** 
(0.15) 
Intra-regional trade bias     
EU 1.67*** 
(0.13) 
1.77*** 
(0.12) 
0.22* 
(0.13) 
-0.91*** 
(0.16) 
APEC 1.83*** 
(0.16) 
2.31*** 
(0.16) 
0.52*** 
(0.10) 
1.42*** 
(0.12) 
MERCOSUR 2.56*** 
(0.42) 
2.95*** 
(0.42) 
0.77*** 
(0.18) 
1.49*** 
(0.43) 
NAFTA -0.38 
(0.41) 
-0.52  
(0.43) 
-0.26 
(0.23) 
-1.55** 
(0.69) 
ASEAN 2.06*** 
(0.35) 
1.89*** 
(0.35) 
2.30*** 
(0.54) 
0.58 
(0.37) 
Extra-regional trade bias     
EU_td 1.01*** 
(0.10) 
1.17*** 
(0.10) 
-0.30*** 
(0.10) 
-0.15 
(0.09) 
APEC_td -0.33*** 
(0.10) 
0.17* 
(0.11) 
0.44*** 
(0.07) 
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
MERCOSUR_td -1.04*** 
(0.18) 
-0.60*** 
(0.18) 
0.91*** 
(0.17) 
0.83*** 
(0.17) 
NAFTA_td -0.37* 
(0.19) 
-0.46**  
(0.19) 
-0.46*** 
(0.14) 
-0.46*** 
(0.14) 
ASEAN_td 0.85*** 
(0.15) 
0.67*** 
(0.15) 
0.65** 
(0.28) 
1.14*** 
(0.29) 
R2 0.35 0.36 0.78 0.54 
RMSE 3.7792 3.7521 2.2934 3.1913 
Dependent variable: log of real imports of homogeneous products. In each case, Data covers 149,623 
observations. Intercepts are not reported and robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs dyads) 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% level significance, respectively. 
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Table 2.5: Gravity Model Estimates of the Linder Effect on the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Countries 
Independent Variable: OLS Country-pair fixed effects Country-specific fixed effects 
Differentiated Reference- 
priced 
Homogeneous Differentiated Reference- 
priced 
Homogeneous Differentiated Reference- 
priced 
Homogeneous 
Log of exporter’s GDP 1.12*** 
(0.11) 
0.99*** 
(0.13) 
0.63*** 
(0.17) 
5.99*** 
(2.05) 
5.12** 
(2.38) 
0.80 
(2.95) 
3.57** 
(1.75) 
4.38** 
(2.19) 
0.68 
(2.66) 
Log of importer’s GDP 0.65*** 
(0.10) 
0.82*** 
(0.11) 
0.71*** 
(0.15) 
3.59 
(2.26) 
6.32** 
(2.75) 
5.79* 
(3.48) 
0.82 
(2.26) 
5.12* 
(2.71) 
4.74 
(2.96) 
Log of exporter’s GDP 
per capita 
1.69*** 
(0.14) 
1.22*** 
(0.16) 
0.91*** 
(0.24) 
-5.67** 
(2.35) 
-4.35* 
(2.50) 
-1.46 
(3.46) 
-2.72 
(1.96) 
-3.45 
(2.33) 
-1.05 
(2.99) 
Log of importer’s GDP 
per capita 
1.36*** 
(0.15) 
0.97*** 
(0.16) 
1.28*** 
(0.23) 
-3.90 
(2.39) 
-5.52* 
(3.07) 
-4.81 
(3.90) 
-0.85 
(2.34) 
-3.97 
(3.00) 
-3.55 
(3.30) 
Linder 0.00 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.12) 
-0.10 
(0.17) 
0.06 
(0.20) 
-0.03 
(0.27) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
0.19*** 
(0.07) 
Log of distance -1.16*** 
(0.36) 
-0.76** 
(0.37) 
-1.33** 
(0.62) 
   -0.77*** 
(0.28) 
-0.54* 
(0.29) 
-1.04*** 
(0.38) 
Common Border 1.46*** 
(0.53) 
0.79 
(0.56) 
1.18 
(0.74) 
   1.65*** 
(0.51) 
1.02* 
(0.57) 
1.43** 
(0.66) 
Common Language 0.95*** 
(0.24) 
0.40 
(0.29) 
1.12*** 
(0.43) 
   -0.48 
(0.39) 
-0.75* 
(0.40) 
-0.88** 
(0.45) 
Landlocked -0.83 
(0.69) 
-0.72 
(0.81) 
-3.36*** 
(1.08) 
   (dropped) (dropped) (dropped) 
Islands 0.11 
(0.21) 
0.00 
(0.22) 
-0.16 
(0.32) 
   1.87 
(6.42) 
12.71* 
(7.73) 
11.93 
(8.45) 
PTA 0.41* 
(0.22) 
0.13 
(0.24) 
1.20*** 
(0.34) 
0.23 
(0.20) 
-0.18 
(0.21) 
0.28 
(0.30) 
0.03 
(0.20) 
-0.37 
(0.24) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
R
2
 0.76 0.64 0.56 0.8897 0.84 0.83 0.81 0.73 0.72 
RMSE 1.8284 2.0899 2.7664 1.2945 1.4336 1.7707 1.6681 1.8151 2.2601 
Dependent variable: log of real imports by commodity covering 1,555 observations equally. Intercepts are not reported and robust standard errors 
(clustered by country-pairs dyads) in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% level significance, respectively. PTA variable includes 
ASEAN and APEC. 
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Appendix Table A2.1: List of Preferential Trading Arrangements 
Abbreviation Name of PTA Start Member countries (year joined) 
ANZCERTA Australia – New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement 
1983 Australia, New Zealand 
APEC Asia Pacific Economic 
Community 
1989 Australia, Brunei, Canada, China 
(1991), Chile (1994),Taiwan (1991), 
Hong Kong (1991), Indonesia, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Mexico 
(1993), New Zealand, Papua New 
Guinea (1993), Peru (1998), 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
United States, Vietnam (1998). 
AP Andean Community / 
Andean Pact 
1969 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Venezuela (1973),  
Former: Chile (1969-76). 
AFTA Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Free Trade Area 
1967 Brunei (1984), Cambodia (1998), 
Indonesia, Laos (1997), Malaysia, 
Myanmar (1997), the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
(1995). 
EU European Union 1958 Austria (1995), Belgium, Denmark 
(1973), Finland (1995), France, 
Germany, Greece (1981), 
Luxembourg, Ireland (1973), Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal (1986), Spain 
(1986), Sweden (1995), United 
Kingdom (1973). 
LAIA/LAFTA Latin America 
Integration Agreement 
1960 Argentina, Bolivia (1967), Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia (1961), Ecuador 
(1961), Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, Venezuela (1966). 
MERCOSUR Southern Cone Common 
Market 
1991 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay 
NAFTA Canada-US Free Trade 
Arrangement / North 
America Free Trade 
Agreement 
1988 Canada, United States, Mexico 
(1994). 
Source: Eicher, Henn and Papageorgiou (2008). 
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Appendix Table A2.2: Countries in Sample   
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola 
Argentina 
Armenia 
Australia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Bahamas 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Belize 
Benin 
Bermuda 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Canada 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Chile 
China 
China, Hong Kong SAR 
China, Macao SAR 
Colombia 
 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
Cote Divoire 
Croatia 
Cuba 
Cyprus 
Czechoslovak 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 
Denmark 
Djibouti 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia 
Ethiopia 
Falkland Islands 
Fiji 
Finland 
France 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Georgia 
Germany 
Ghana 
Gibraltar 
Greece 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
 
 
 
 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
Iceland 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Jamaica 
Japan 
Jordan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Korea, the Republic of 
Kuwait 
Kyrgyzstan 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Libya 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
Appendix Table A2.2: Countries in Sample (cont.) 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Monaco 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Nepal 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Norway 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Qatar  
Romania 
Russia 
Rwanda 
Samoa 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Spain 
Sri Lanka 
St. Helena 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Liechtenstein 
 
 
Syria 
Taiwan 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
United Kingdom 
Ukraine 
United Arab Emirates 
Uruguay 
United States 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela 
Viet Nam 
Yemen 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Emergence of East Asian Regionalism: Financial Issues 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the aftermath of the recent East Asian financial crises, the process of the 
regional economic integration among the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) countries has 
witnessed a rapid surge in the volume of intra-regional trade and investment. This 
phenomenon has caught the attention of scholars in the fields of both international 
trade and finance in several respects. On the trade side, the fact that intra-regional 
trade continued to increase after the proliferation of the preferential trade agreements 
(PTA) between East Asian countries makes it less interesting to explore as to whether 
trade liberalization in this region has generated a substantial expansion of intra-
regional trade. Instead, a large body of empirical literature has been devoted to 
assessing whether the trading blocs in the region represented building or stumbling 
blocks (e.g., Elliott and Ikemoto, 2004; Magee, 2008; and Eicher, Henn, and 
Papageorgiou, 2008). 
On the financial side, however, despite the broader and deeper regional 
financial integration, special attention still has been paid to the question of why Asian 
portfolio investors invest so little in Asia (e.g., Eichengreen and Park, 2003; 
Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2006; and García-Herrero et al., 2009). This 
pattern is not surprising. It reflects the fact that investors from APT countries have 
been heavily engaged in financial markets outside the region—in 2001 alone, for 
example, investors from APT economies devoted only 5.4 percent of their 
 
 
49 
 
international portfolios to the capital markets within the region, while almost 70 
percent of the resources were invested in the Euro area, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom, according to the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 
(CPIS). 
In the view of García-Herrero et al. (2009), the fact that Asian investors do not 
invest in their neighboring countries seems puzzling in several aspects. First, in 
contrast to the prediction of neo-classical growth theory, Asian financial resources 
tended to flow away from emerging markets and towards developed economies, 
where the average rate of return is lower. Second, geographical proximity did not 
seem to affect portfolio asset allocations across the region, contradicting the 
theoretical conjecture of the gravity model. And third, although some existing 
empirical studies suggest a link between trade and financial flows, the degree of 
financial integration in Asia still remained relatively low compared with the intra-
regional trade integration. 
Nonetheless, as data became available over a longer period of time, this study 
observed a shifting pattern of foreign portfolio investments. The first stylized fact is 
that East Asian investors have increasingly devoted more resources to the financial 
markets in their neighboring countries, from only 5.4 percent of their foreign portfolio 
investments in 2001 to about 10.3 percent at the end of 2009. Similarly, Euro area and 
US investors also allocated more financial resources to the East Asian capital 
markets, both in terms of volume and as a percentage share of their total portfolio 
holdings. Moreover, the acceleration of cross-border portfolio investment across the 
region seemed to coincide with a surge in the volume of intra-regional trade. These 
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developments raise the question of what has been happening in the East Asian 
financial markets recently. 
This study seeks to understand the recent development of financial market 
integration in East Asia, paying particular attention to the cross-border portfolio 
investment. It should be noted that although the degree of regional financial 
integration can be measured from various angles (e.g., bilateral bank loans and 
foreign direct investment), the focus on the cross-border portfolio holdings is aimed 
at fitting into Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004)’s theoretical framework. In seeking to 
understand the composition of the cross-border portfolio investment in APT 
economies, special attention must be paid to the role of the specific characteristics 
both at the bilateral level as well as in the host country. This work first explores the 
role of the various factors at the bilateral level using country-specific fixed effects to 
absorb any time-invariant country-specific characteristic that influence cross-border 
portfolio holdings. These include the influence of asymmetric information and 
informational costs, the correlation between growth rates, and the link between trade 
and financial integration. Thereafter, this empirical specification is relaxed to assess 
the importance of country-specific characteristics in host countries, paying particular 
attention to the role of the capital market development and financial center, as well as 
the effect of capital controls. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides 
stylized facts about the cross-border portfolio holdings of selected investing 
countries, while the composition of international portfolio holdings is reviewed in 
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section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents methodology and data. Section 3.5 reports the 
empirical findings and section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Stylized Facts of the Cross-Border Portfolio Holdings among APT Countries 
There are two comprehensive datasets on cross-border financial positions: the 
IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) and the BIS consolidated 
banking statistics. The CPIS dataset provides information on cross-border portfolio 
holdings of short- and long-term debt securities as well as equity securities. Currently, 
there are more than 75 economies that participate in the survey, including 9 
economies from the APT countries. In the latter case, the BIS consolidated banking 
statistics provide unique information on cross-border bank claims for some 24 
creditor countries. Nevertheless, this study intends to focus solely on the IMF’s cross-
border portfolio holdings so as to fit into Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004)’s theoretical 
framework.
32
 
Table 3.1 provides the geographical distribution of total cross-border portfolio 
holdings across the major regions at the end of 2001, as well as the preliminary data 
for 2009. The first stylized fact emerging from the 2001 data is that Japan, Hong 
Kong SAR and Singapore were the three largest portfolio investors in the region, with 
a total investment of approximately $1.6 trillion. Interestingly, these portfolio 
holdings accounted for more than 98.9 percent of the total cross-border portfolio 
assets held by APT countries.  
Another noteworthy feature is that investors from the ASEAN + 3 economies 
at that time devoted only 5.4 percent of their portfolios to the capital markets within 
                                                             
32 This issue will be discussed in the next section. 
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the region, while almost 70 percent of the resources were invested in the Euro area, 
United States, and United Kingdom. In contrast to the investment pattern among APT 
economies that heavily invested in other regions, Euro area investors devoted more 
than 53.8 percent of their portfolio assets to the capital markets in the Euro area and 
3.2 percent in APT countries. 
Although the total value of foreign portfolio investments among APT 
countries has increased rapidly to $4.2 trillion at the end of 2009, the geographical 
distribution patterns of international portfolio holdings generally remained 
unchanged. Namely, Japan, Hong Kong SAR, and Singapore still remained the three 
largest portfolio investors in the region, with a total portfolio investment of 
approximately $4 trillion, or around 95.8 percent of the total foreign portfolio assets 
held by investors in APT economies. Euro area and US investors have allocated 
slightly more resources to the financial markets in this region, from 3.2 and 13.2 
percent of their portfolios in 2001 to 3.4 and 13.8 percent in 2009, respectively. 
Even so, there still have been some significant changes in the structure of 
portfolio holdings among APT countries that are worth noting. First, investors from 
the APT economies have increasingly allocated more resources to the capital markets 
within the region, from only 5.4 percent of their foreign portfolio investments in 2001 
to about 10.3 percent at the end of 2009. By contrast, the shares of Euro area, US, and 
UK portfolio securities held by APT countries have declined considerably to 21.3, 
26.8, and 8.1 percent at the end of 2009 in relation to 24.9, 34.3, and 9.8 percent in 
2001. Second, the size of each APT member countries’ international portfolio 
holdings has grown remarkably over the past decade. For instance, the Republic of 
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Korea held foreign portfolio assets of approximately $102 billion at the end of 2009, 
compared with only $8 billion in 2001. Likewise, the size of Thai portfolio holdings 
has also increased substantially from less than $1 billion to around $23 billion over 
the period. 
Tables 3.2 through 3.4 report the geographical allocation of cross-border 
portfolio holdings classified by type of securities at the end of 2001, as well as the 
preliminary data for 2009. Focus first on the distribution of portfolio equity holdings 
reported in Table 3.2. The three largest portfolio equity investors among APT 
countries still were Japan, Hong Kong SAR, and Singapore, with the total investment 
of approximately $353 billion in 2001and $1.2 trillion in 2009. These holdings 
accounted for around 99 and 92 percent of the total foreign equity assets held by APT 
countries in 2001 and 2009, respectively. Although the equity securities held by APT 
economies were heavily skewed towards the U.S. stock markets in 2001, this bias has 
vanished in recent years as investors from ASEAN + 3 economies have increasingly 
devoted their resources to the stock markets in the region. Another noteworthy feature 
emerging from the 2009 data is that there was cross-country heterogeneity in the 
geographical distribution of equity holdings among APT countries; that is, while 
Japan appeared to be a country with a strong bias towards the US stock markets, the 
portfolio holdings of Hong Kong SAR and Singapore were heavily skewed towards 
the markets within the region. 
Next, consider jointly the geographical breakdown of long- and short-term 
debt securities reported in Table 3.3 and 3.4. One interesting fact emerging from these 
tables is that investors from ASEAN + 3 economies devoted sizeable resources to 
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long-term debt securities rather than investing in short-term debt securities during the 
past decade. Specifically, the share of long-term debt securities held by APT 
countries in 2001 and 2009 accounted for more than 70.7 and 63.4 percent of the total 
portfolio holdings, compared to only 7.3 and 4.2 percent in the case of short-term 
ones. However, if Japan is excluded, the share of long-term debt securities only 
amounted to 42.2 and 31.8 percent of the total portfolio holdings, compared with 18.3 
and 11.1 percent in the case of short-term debt during the same period. Again, cross-
country heterogeneity in the geographical distribution of both short- and long-term 
debt securities is found to exist among APT countries. Korea and Philippines, for 
example, appeared to be countries with a strong bias towards U.S. debt securities, 
while Japan’s debt securities holdings were skewed towards the markets in Euro area 
countries and the United States.  
Taken together, the structures of cross-border asset holdings highlighted so far 
exhibit a number of stylized facts regarding the behavior of international portfolio 
investors. First, like the Euro area, there was considerable heterogeneity in the 
geographical distribution of portfolio holdings among the individual APT member 
states.
33
 Second, Japan was the only country among ASEAN + 3 members that 
allocated substantial resources to the long-term debt securities issued by Euro area 
and US residents, whereas the others increasingly invested in the stock markets in the 
neighboring member countries. And lastly, the investment patterns appear to suggest 
that Western portfolio investors also increasingly devoted their resources to the risky 
                                                             
33 See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 2005) for the patterns of cross-border portfolio holdings of the 
Euro area countries. 
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securities (especially equity securities) issued by the entities residents in the ASEAN 
+ 3 economies. 
 
3.3 Literature Review on the Determinants of International Portfolio Holdings  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the gravity model has become the 
workhorse model of international trade for understanding the determinants of bilateral 
trade flows. Along with its strong theoretical validation that can be derived from a 
variety of different foundations, the model has been successful in predicting bilateral 
trade flows as a positive function of economic size and a negative function of distance 
between them.34 More recently, a developing literature has also attempted to explain 
variations in international capital flows using the gravity model. This seems 
interesting given that, unlike commodities, distance is less likely to be related to 
transportation costs since financial assets are weightless. Furthermore, what is 
particularly puzzling is that a substantial number of empirical studies have indeed 
found a strong negative correlation between trade in financial assets and distance, 
which may contradict the theory of portfolio diversification.
35
 
With regards to the puzzles above, Portes and Rey (2005) have clarified the 
role of geographical distance in the context of financial assets as a proxy for 
information frictions. The explanation is quite simple: distance tends to deter 
economic agents from interacting with one another; the longer the distance, the lower 
                                                             
34 These include the increasing returns to scale (IRS) model, Ricardian models, Armington models, and 
Hechsher-Ohlin (H-O) models. 
35 Imbs (1999) and Baxter and Kouparitsas (2004) have found that business-cycle comovement tends 
to be negatively correlated with distance. So according to the idea of portfolio diversification, one way 
investors can minimize idiosyncratic risks is to hold portfolio securities issued by residents of distant 
economies where the degree of business-cycle comovement is relatively low. In this regard, cross-
border trade in financial assets should increase with distance. 
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the volume of information flows and the greater the information asymmetries and 
information costs. Portes et al. (2001) compared the role of distance as a proxy for 
informational asymmetries across different types of financial securities between the 
U.S. and 40 other economies. They found that the estimated coefficients on the 
distance variables are much larger in the case of transactions in corporate bonds and 
equities than that in treasury bonds. This empirical evidence, together with the fact 
that government bonds are less subject to information asymmetries than the corporate 
securities, leads the authors to confirm that a negative relationship between bilateral 
trade in financial assets and distance is a result of informational frictions. 
Besides the standard gravity variables (i.e., economic masses of source and 
destination countries, as well as distance), numerous additional hypotheses were 
proposed in order to explain variation in cross-border portfolio holdings. These 
determinants can be classified into two broad categories: (1) international portfolio 
diversification and return-chasing behavior and (2) information costs and 
informational asymmetries. 
 
3.3.1 International Portfolio Diversification and Return-Chasing Behavior 
In finance, international portfolio diversification has long been widely 
recognized as an efficient method for reducing idiosyncratic risks as well as 
improving portfolio performance. Grubel (1968), for example, illustrated 
mathematically that, given an equal expected rate of return, investors can reduce 
variance by diversifying investments across countries. Likewise, with equal 
variances, international portfolio diversification can lead to higher expected rates of 
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return, compared to non-diversified investments. De Santis and Sarno (2008) found 
that US investors can be better off by diversifying their portfolio investments across 
countries, in which return co-movements are low, compared with relying entirely on 
either domestic or worldwide markets.
36
 In line with these findings, the benefits of 
portfolio diversification have also been noted in a substantial academic literature (see, 
e.g., Rowland and Tesar, 2004; Driessen and Laeven, 2007; Gerard et al., 2002; and 
Brandt et al., 2006).  
Given the empirical findings regarding the gains from international portfolio 
diversification mentioned above, it is sensible to relate trade in financial assets to the 
degree of business cycle comovement between home and foreign countries. This 
relationship is, indeed, in line with the work of Faruqee et al. (2004), who conjectured 
that bilateral equity holdings should be positively correlated with the returns of 
foreign securities, but negatively associated with the comovement between the asset 
returns of home and foreign markets. By including these variables in the gravity 
model, they found that the correlation of the stock market returns played a robust role 
in explaining international portfolio holdings, while the empirical support for a 
return-chasing behavior was surprisingly weak.
37
 García-Herrero et al. (2009) made a 
similar argument by highlighting some important features of the return variables (i.e., 
asset returns and currency returns) as the key determinants of cross-border portfolio 
                                                             
36 It is interesting to note here that, in general, the gain from international portfolio diversification 
tends to decrease with the increase in the degree of financial market integration. See De Santis and 
Sarno (2008) for a discussion on this issue. 
37 Note that a return-chasing behavior refers to investor’s strategy of chasing performance.  
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holdings.
38 Other existing empirical literatures providing evidence of a return-chasing 
behavior include Brennan and Cao (1997) and Froot et al. (2001). 
In contrast to the above findings, Portes and Rey (2000) studied bilateral 
transactions in the equity securities of 14 countries and found, at best, only weak 
evidence of return-chasing and portfolio diversification incentives. Focusing on the 
international investment positions at the end of 2001, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) 
found that investors from source countries prefer investing in economies with similar 
underlying economic fundamentals, instead of devoting their resources to the stock 
markets in distinctly different countries. In their study, the cross-border equity 
holdings are significantly and positively associated with (1) the correlation between 
growth rates, (2) the correlation between stock market returns, and (3) the correlation 
between economic growth of a source country and host-country stock returns. Among 
others, weak empirical support for a portfolio diversification motive has also been 
noted (see, e.g., Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai, 2006; French and 
Poterba,1991; and Portes and Rey, 2005). 
 
3.3.2 Information Costs and Informational Asymmetries 
Despite large potential gains from international diversification, several 
existing literatures find that investors indeed forgo the potential benefits of risk 
sharing and choose to hold domestic and/or foreign securities over and above the 
amount predicted by traditional portfolio theory. Faruqee et al. (2004), for instance, 
showed that investors in all selected sample countries held much more domestic 
                                                             
38 One of the most striking results emphasized in García-Herrero et al. (2009) is the empirical fact that 
the lack of market liquidity in Asian capital markets is a significant reason why investors did not invest 
in the region. 
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equities than the benchmark share predicted by the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM). This home bias ranged from 14 percent in the case of Ireland to 96 percent 
for Malaysia. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004; 2005) compared the actual share of 
foreign portfolio equity holdings in the major developed countries with ―a simple 
predictive benchmark.‖39 Their results indicated that equity holdings of the Euro area 
and Japan at the end of 2001 were 11.6 and 3.2 percent overweight in the United 
Kingdom, respectively. The United States, on the contrary, was 7.5 percent 
underweight in Japan during the same period. 
In response to this, a large body of literature has attempted to explain the 
home bias puzzle in financial markets from various different angles. Davis et al. 
(2000), in one respect, pointed out that the reason investors prefer not to diversify 
their portfolios internationally is partly because the hedging cost considerably 
exceeds the benefits of portfolio diversification. Beside the role of return-chasing and 
diversification motives, the work of Portes and Rey (2000) also conjectured that the 
volume of bilateral equity flows might be driven by information transmission or 
informational asymmetries. In their experiments, they found that telephone calls and 
bank branches (information transmission variables) were positively correlated with 
cross-border equity flows. The degree of insider trading (as proxy for informational 
asymmetry), in contrast, had a negative effect on the flows.
40
 This evidence appeared 
to suggest that, as Portes and Rey stated, ―International capital markets are not 
                                                             
39 According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), ―the predicted share is the ratio of host country's stock 
market capitalization to the stock market capitalization of the world minus the source country. The 
actual share: ratio of source country's equity investment in host country to total source country foreign 
equity investment.‖ 
40 See Warnock (2002) for a discussion on the drawbacks of using flow data to measure bilateral 
portfolio holdings. 
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frictionless: they are segmented by informational asymmetries…Countries have 
different information sets, which heavily influence their international transactions 
(p.27).‖ 
Another form of information asymmetry takes place as investors know much 
more about firms and the economic outlook in their home country than they do about 
those in foreign economies. In Gordon and Bovenberg (1996)’s view, this 
informational disadvantage can hamper international capital mobility since investors 
are vulnerable to a significant loss when trying to acquire assets in foreign countries. 
Gehrig (1993) made a similar argument by stating that asymmetric information can 
result in domestic bias since foreign securities (in domestic investor sentiment) 
appear to be more risky than domestic assets, even in the absence of foreign exchange 
risk. He further added that, with the assumption that information is symmetric across 
countries, home bias in the asset markets should continue to exist because investors 
still face a variety of risks when investing abroad (e.g., foreign exchange risk, 
purchasing power risk, and capital market restrictions). 
For this reason, some of the existing literatures on the determinants of cross-
border portfolio investment have also attempted to take into account the role of 
capital controls in the model. In the perspective of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), 
the volume of international portfolio holdings is presumed to be artificially small 
when capital controls are imposed or have recently been in place. Nonetheless, their 
empirical results indicated that capital controls turned out to be insignificant in 
explaining the composition of the aggregate portfolio holdings. Balli et al. (2009) 
studied the patterns of foreign portfolio inflows into the Gulf Corporation Council 
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countries (GCC) and found, in contrast, a statistically significant correlation between 
capital controls in host countries and the level of foreign portfolio holdings. In the 
work of García-Herrero et al. (2009), capital controls in source countries appeared to 
play an effective role in restricting capital outflows during the period 2001-2005. The 
controls in host countries, on the contrary, were found to be ineffective in curbing hot 
capital inflows; or simply put, controls on capital inflows were found to be positively 
related to the volume of cross-border portfolio holdings. This positive correlation, as 
the authors pointed out, may simply reflect the fact that capital controls in destination 
countries are typically imposed in response to a surge in capital inflows and such 
controls might fail to stop the influx of speculative money. 
Another potential influence on cross-border investment is the degree of trade 
integration between host and source countries. Theoretically, bilateral trade in goods 
may encourage cross-border portfolio flows for a number of reasons. More generally, 
international commodity trading can act as a conduit for information transmission, 
which may help reduce the degree of informational asymmetry through some forms 
of familiarity effects. Furthermore, investment in equity securities issued by a 
resident of a trading partner country can be exploited to hedge against consumption 
risk from importation due to country-specific shocks in that economy (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti, 2005). Moreover, lending money to importing countries with closer 
trade linkages can prevent a creditor country’s export from shrinking (Rose and 
Spiegel, 2002). Empirically, a large body of recent studies suggested that bilateral 
trade in goods, indeed, helped encourage cross-border portfolio investment. These 
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literatures include Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 2005), García-Herrero et al. 
(2009), Balli et al. (2009) and Lee (2008). 
In addition, as generally found in related empirical studies, portfolio 
investments have also been modeled as a function of cultural, historical, or economic 
links. Two common informational dummies include colonization and official 
language that enter the model as a proxy for both information costs and information 
asymmetry. The idea for these dummies is quite straightforward: sharing a common 
language or a colonial relationship helps spur bilateral portfolio investment since the 
costs of acquiring information between these markets are likely to be lower, 
compared with other economies. Besides these two variables, the regional trading 
bloc or economic community has also been employed to model cross-border portfolio 
holdings for similar reasons (see, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) for ―Euro culture‖ 
dummy variable, Lee (2008) for intra-East Asia dummy, and Balli et al. (2009) for 
GCC and religion dummy variables). 
 
3.4 Methodology and Data 
3.4.1 The Gravity Model of Cross-Border Portfolio Holdings 
The empirical model in this chapter is developed for assessing the 
determinants of cross-country portfolio inflows into APT countries, based on Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2004)’s theoretical framework. In its original version, Obstfeld 
and Rogoff (2000) first constructed this model in a two-country setting. Recently, the 
framework was further extended to an N-country setting by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2004) so as to draw out the implications of theoretical conjecture for the composition 
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of cross-border asset holdings among developed and emerging market economies. 
The basic idea of the model assumes that the heterogeneity in consumer preferences 
and international trade costs in commodity markets can influence bilateral equity 
portfolios. In particular, the presence of these factors can naturally lead to a home 
bias in portfolio investments despite the completeness of international financial 
markets. Mathematically, the model has the following logarithmic form
41
: 
       ) =    +    +                +          +      ,  (3.1) 
where     is the volume of equity holdings of source country i in host country j,    
and    are constant terms for country i and j,   represents the elasticity of substitution 
between commodities,     is iceberg shipping costs,     denotes the relative 
preferences of consumers in country j, and     is the ratio of source country j’s wealth 
in world economy. 
Because information on consumer preferences and iceberg shipping costs is 
not readily accessible, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) employed the volume of 
imports as a proxy for these variables. Hence, the composition of bilateral equity 
investments can be written as: 
       ) =   +   +            +      +    ,    (3.2) 
where    and    are a couple set of source- and host-country fixed effects,       is 
the imports of country i from country j,     represents a vector of the country-pair 
characteristics that drive the volume of equity investments from source country i to 
                                                             
41 Note that this equation is derived from the utility function for consumption. See Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2004) for details. 
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host economy j, and     denotes the error term. Intuitively, this empirical framework 
implies that with the existence of preference heterogeneity and transportation costs, 
economic agents in source country i naturally face heterogeneous country-specific 
risk profile (e.g., productivity shocks) when importing products from their trading 
partners. And, one effective way to reduce the risk (or more specifically, to maximize 
utility) is to devote substantial financial resources to investing in the capital markets 
of their major trading partners. Thus, the volume of cross-country equity holdings, in 
this sense, is assumed to be a positive function of the level of bilateral imports. 
It is also important to note that the inclusion of country-specific fixed effects 
is aimed at absorbing any time-invariant country-specific factor that influences cross-
border portfolio investments. Thus, all country-specific variables (e.g., GDP, per 
capita GDP, stock market capitalization, etc.) are automatically excluded from 
equation (3.2). In common with the existing literatures, a set of the gravity-type 
variables at a bilateral level (   ) is incorporated into the model as follows:  
        ) =    +              +              +            +              
      +  
 
             +           +               +     , (3.3) 
where t is time, i and j denote source and host country, respectively. The other 
variables are defined as:  
      is the total cross-country portfolio holdings of source country i in host 
country j, 
        is the imports of country i from country j, 
        is the distance between country i and j, 
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        is a binary variable equal to unity if i and j have a common official 
language and zero otherwise, 
          is a binary variable equal to unity if i colonizes j (or vice versa) and 
zero otherwise, 
            is the time zone difference between country i and j, 
       is a binary variable equal to unity if both i and j are APT countries and 
zero otherwise, 
           is the correlation between GDP growth rates of country i and j, 
      denotes the error term. 
Because the purpose of this chapter is to examine the composition of cross-
country portfolio investments in APT countries, the sample of host countries is 
restricted to the 10 economies in the region. The list of source and host countries is 
reported in Appendix Table A3.1. In the standard gravity model of commodity trade, 
geographical distance is entered into the model as a good proxy for transaction costs. 
In the gravity model of bilateral portfolio investments, however, distance is treated as 
a proxy for information costs in the financial market. Yet, despite the difference in 
conjectures, distance is consistently assumed to be negatively correlated with the 
volume of both trade in goods and trade in financial assets.  
Among the other conventional gravity-type variables, common language and 
colonial ties are expected to encourage the volume of portfolio investments since 
communicating a common language or having a colonial relation can help reduce the 
cost of acquiring information. Similar to the gravity model of commodity trade, the 
regional dummy variable (APT) can be employed to assess the existence of regional 
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bias in bilateral portfolio investments. If the APT dummy variable turns out to be 
positive and significant, it would indicate that investors from the ASEAN Plus Three 
countries, indeed, have been disproportionately investing within the region relative to 
others. 
In contrast to the standard model of commodity trade, which ignores real-time 
trading, the overlap between operating hours of capital markets in any two countries 
can create difficulties in communication between economic agents in the markets. To 
check this, the variable for time zone difference is incorporated into equation (3.3) as 
a proxy for interaction difficulties. If this variable turns out to be negatively 
significant, it will indicate that the overlap between business hours in any two 
economies, indeed, has hampered cross-border portfolio investments. 
Furthermore, to investigate the role of international diversification in 
explaining the variation of bilateral portfolio holdings, the correlation between 
economic growth is utilized to capture this motive. If the motivation for international 
diversification exists, this coefficient will be negatively significant. In addition, 
perhaps what is particularly interesting in equation (3.3) is the link between the level 
of bilateral trade in goods and portfolio investments. In the previous chapter, it has 
been found that the regional trade integration within ASEAN Plus Three economies 
has actually played an essential role in generating the volume of bilateral trade 
between its member states. In this chapter, this study further investigates whether 
trade liberalization in the region can help promote cross-country portfolio investments 
between them. One way to investigate this connection is to apply the methodology of 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) by introducing an import variable into the model. If 
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the coefficient of import variable turns out to be positively significant, it would imply 
that deeper trade integration in the region, indeed, has played an indirect role in 
encouraging portfolio investments between APT member states, or a common factor 
affects both. 
 
3.4.2 Data 
The dataset of total bilateral asset holdings is collected from the IMF’s 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). This survey provides new 
information on cross-border portfolio holdings of equity securities as well as short- 
and long-term debt securities that are not a component of foreign direct investment, 
foreign reserves, or financial derivatives. Initially, the preliminary panel data consists 
of 74 investing countries over the period of 2001 to 2009. Yet, since offshore and 
small financial centers are typically treated as pure financial intermediaries and 
considered as neither true investing countries nor final destinations for investments, 
these countries are ruled out.
42
 In addition, because China and Vietnam do not 
currently participate in the survey, these countries are entered in the regression only 
as host countries, but not as investing economies.
43 Thus, the ultimate dataset of total 
cross-border portfolio holdings consists of 58 source countries and 10 destination 
economies. This dataset is then converted to real terms using the US GDP deflator 
that was obtained from the IFS. And, in common with the previous empirical 
                                                             
42 The list of the offshore and small financial centers is drawn from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). 
These economies include Aruba, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Bermuda, The Cayman Islands, Cyprus, 
Guernsey, The Isle of Man, Jersey, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macao SAR, Malta, Mauritius, the 
Netherlands Antilles, Panama, and Vanuatu. 
43 Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao, and Myanmar are also excluded from the model since these 
countries do not currently have a capital market. 
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literatures, the log of (1 + real portfolio holdings) is utilized as the dependent variable 
in equation (3.3) to account for the great number of observations that are equal to 
zero. 
Bilateral import data is collected from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics 
(DOTS). This dataset is also converted to real terms. So in this chapter, bilateral 
import variable is defined as log of (1 + real bilateral imports). The geographical 
distance between two countries is drawn from ―the Great circle distances between 
capital cities‖ and Andrew K. Rose’s home page. This work also exploits the same 
source for information on colonization and common language, while the time zone 
data is obtained from worldtimezone.com.
44 And lastly, the dataset for annual GDP 
growth rates is collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI) so as to 
calculate the 5-year rolling correlation between GDP growth rates of source and host 
countries. Summary statistics for all variables used in this chapter are presented in 
Table 3.5. 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
Table 3.6 reports the benchmark results for the composition of total cross-
border portfolio holdings in APT economies. To reduce any potential bias as much as 
possible, a set of source- and host- country fixed effects are incorporated in all 
regressions. The determinants of bilateral asset holdings are first examined by using 
the OLS method. The estimated results obtained from this method are reported in 
column 2 and 3. Nonetheless, since more than one-fourth of the dataset of the cross-
border portfolio holdings are equal to zero, OLS regression may provide biased 
                                                             
44 http://www.worldtimezone.com/ 
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results when this dependent variable is censored. To deal with such possible 
inconsistent estimates, the determinants of cross-country portfolio holdings are also 
explored by using the Tobit method (as shown in column 4 and 5). 
The empirical assessment in this section begins with an examination of Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2004)’s conjecture by regressing cross-border asset holdings only 
on imports. As can be seen in column 2 and 4, the results indicate that the volume of 
cross-border portfolio holdings is positively associated with the level of bilateral 
imports at the 1% level of significance, regardless of the econometric technique. To 
be specific, the estimated coefficient obtained from OLS method is only about 0.26 
(s.e. = 0.05); however, as the dependent variable is censored using the Tobit 
technique, the coefficient of imports indeed increases to 0.48 (s.e. = 0.01). Or simply 
put, this empirical evidence appears to suggest that a 1% increase in the level of 
bilateral imports of source country i from host country j, other things constant, has 
resulted in an increase in the volume of the asset investments in APT economies by 
between 29.7% and 61.6%, depending on the estimation methods.
45
 
Evidently, this positive relationship is consistent with the views that bilateral 
trade in goods can encourage portfolio investments through several mechanisms. As 
discussed earlier, one of the most common perceptions is that international trade can 
act as a conduit for information transmission, which helps reduce the degree of 
information asymmetry through some forms of familiarity effects. A more 
complicated view is that source countries tend to allocate substantial financial 
                                                             
45 For example, given that the estimated coefficient on imports in column 2 is 0.26, so e0.26 = 1.2969. 
Thus, a 1% increase in the level of bilateral imports raises the volume of cross-border portfolio 
holdings by about 29.7% ((1.2969-1)*100%). 
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resources to their largest trading partners to hedge against consumption risks due to 
country-specific shocks in exporting countries (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2004). In 
addition, despite the difference in the country sample, the empirical results in column 
2 and 4 are also in line with the works of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) and Balli et 
al. (2009), reinforcing this study’s finding that bilateral trade has, indeed, played an 
important role in encouraging cross-border portfolio investments in the APT markets. 
Column 3 and 5 of Table 3.6 present the estimated results when the influence 
of other bilateral factors affecting cross-country portfolio holdings are controlled for. 
The first thing to notice is that the coefficients of import variable still remain 
positively significant at the 1% level. And, even though a set of other bilateral factors 
are included, the sizes of the estimated import coefficient decrease only slightly. 
Among the other explanatory variables, geographical distance appears to play an 
essential role in discouraging the cross-border asset investments in APT economies. 
The coefficients for common language are statistically insignificant, as are the 
coefficient for colonial relationship. Although time-zone difference and APT dummy 
enter the OLS regression with the correct signs at the 5 % level of significance, 
neither is statistically significant when estimating with the Tobit technique. 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficients for the correlation between economic growth 
rates have a positive sign and are highly significant, suggesting that investors actually 
prefer investing in APT economies, where the underlying economic fundamentals are 
similar, rather than pursuing international diversification motives. 
So far, this chapter has shown that some bilateral characteristics (i.e., imports, 
geographical distance, and correlation in growth rates) are the key factors driving the 
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portfolio investments into APT countries. Yet, these determinants alone do not seem 
to provide a sufficient explanation for the variation in cross-border portfolio holdings 
in the region, given the existing empirical findings discussed in section 3.3; it is most 
likely that other country-specific characteristics of both host and source country can 
also influence this variation. Nevertheless, since the purpose of this study is to draw 
out policy implications regarding the development of the capital markets in APT 
countries, the rest of this section will pay special attention to the role of host-country 
specific factors in encouraging portfolio investments. The ignorance of the role of 
source-country specific characteristics is, of course, a limitation of this study. 
In terms of econometric methods, although the inclusion of both source- and 
host-country fixed effects can provide unbiased results (Anderson and van Wincoop, 
2003), this methodology indeed does not allow for the exploration of the vital host-
country specific characteristics that may encourage portfolio investments. It is 
because the effects of these country-specific factors (e.g., market capitalization, 
capital controls, and financial center) are already absorbed by the host-country 
dummies. Thus, one way to examine the influence of host-country specific 
characteristics is to relax the specification used in equation (3.3) by controlling only 
for source-country fixed effects. In doing so, nonetheless, it would probably lead to 
the bias resulting from the omission of unobserved country-specific factors in the host 
country, and this study acknowledges such possible bias. The extended model is set 
up as follows: 
        ) =    +              +              +            +              
      +  
 
             +           +               +             
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    +  
 
                   +               +                
    +  
  
             +               +    ,   (3.4) 
where the host-country variables are defined as: 
       is GDP of host country j,  
                  is a binary variable equal to unity if the host country or 
territory is a large international financial center and zero otherwise, 
          is the ratio of private bond market capitalization to GDP, 
          is the ratio of public bond market capitalization to GDP, 
            is the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, 
          is the Chinn-Ito index of financial openness. 
GDP data is extracted from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
(WDI). The dataset is converted to the real terms using the US GDP deflator that is 
obtained from the IFS. Similar to the basic form of the gravity model of commodity 
trade, the host-country GDP is incorporated into equation (3.4) in order to capture the 
importance of economic size in attracting foreign portfolio investment. A common 
perception of this factor is that such bilateral portfolio holdings should be directly 
proportional to the market size of the host country. Furthermore, in some countries or 
territories, such as Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, the financial sectors are relatively 
large, which helps attract larger foreign portfolio investment than other country-
specific characteristics would warrant. For this reason, a dummy variable for large 
international financial centers is introduced in the model to isolate the influence of 
this factor. Information for countries with a large international financial center is 
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gathered from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). Following their classification, only 
Hong Kong SAR and Singapore will be defined as the large international financial 
centers in the region.
46
 
Still, it is arguable that the development of capital markets is one of the 
critical driving forces behind the growing portfolio investments in APT economies. 
To check this possibility, this study adds three different proxies to capture the 
importance of financial market developments in attracting portfolio investments. As 
seen in equation (3.4), these variables include the ratio of private bond market 
capitalization to GDP, the ratio of public bond market capitalization to GDP, and the 
ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. The source of these datasets is the World 
Bank. And for the capital restriction variable, this study uses the Chinn-Ito index 
(also referred to as KAOPEN) to examine the impact of capital controls in the region. 
As discussed in Chinn and Ito (2008), the KAOPEN index provides several 
advantages over the use of a binary variable based on the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). In particular, the 
exploitation of the Chinn-Ito index can help capture the concentration of the capital 
controls more accurately, when compared with the use of a binary dummy variable 
based on the IMF’s AREAER.47 
In Table 3.7, columns 2 and 4 present the results only when the bilateral 
factors and a set of source-country dummies are controlled for. Comparing these to 
the results in columns 3 and 5 of Table 3.6, we see that the omission of host-country 
                                                             
46 Unlike countries or territories with offshore and small financial centers that are already ruled out, 
both Hong Kong SAR and Singapore have domestic stock markets and are considered as the real final 
destination for portfolio investments. See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) for more detail. 
47 See Chinn and Ito (2008) for further discussion on the advantages of the KAOPEN over other 
indexes as well as the construction of the index. 
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specific characteristics generally leads to inconsistent estimates, regardless of the 
econometric technique; all estimated coefficients, except geographical distance, are 
upward biased. 
Columns 3 and 5 report the results from the estimating equation (3.4), with 
solely source-country fixed effects. Again, the estimated coefficients on the bilateral 
factors are pretty similar to the results reported in Table 3.6. To summarize briefly, it 
is found that the inclusion of the host-country explanatory variables reduces the 
magnitude of the import variable considerably although the estimated coefficients still 
remain positively significant. In consonance with the prior results, geographical 
distance enters the regressions as the strongest factor that discourages the cross-
border portfolio investments in the APT countries. On the contrary, the estimated 
coefficients for the common language dummy are positive and modestly significant, 
as are the coefficients on the correlation between economic growths. Furthermore, the 
coefficient for the APT dummy provides evidence suggesting that the APT investors, 
indeed, have been disproportionately investing within the region relative to others. 
Now consider the influence of host-country characteristics in encouraging 
cross-country portfolio investments. Observe that the coefficients of real GDP in the 
host country are always of the expected sign and robustly significant, regardless of 
the estimation technique; the magnitudes of the effect range tightly between 0.38 and 
0.43. This finding appears to suggest that countries with relatively large economies 
tend to attract more foreign portfolio investments than others. In addition, there is 
strong empirical evidence that in some countries like Hong Kong SAR and 
Singapore, the large international financial centers helped attract about 90 to 127 
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percent of foreign portfolio investments greater than other country-specific 
characteristics would warrant. 
Perhaps what is even more interesting in this table is the robust evidence of 
the importance of the capital market developments. Specifically, the estimated 
coefficients on the ratio of private bond market capitalization to GDP are found to 
range between 1.02 and 1.13, whereas those of public bond market and stock market 
value between 1.05 and 1.22, and 0.23 and 0.29, respectively. In terms of statistical 
significance, the coefficients of these ratios are all positively significant at the 1% 
level, regardless of the econometric methods. Apparently, this empirical finding lends 
some support to the perception that sound capital market development can help attract 
foreign portfolio investments through several mechanisms. For example, the 
widening of the capital markets straightforwardly increases the variety of financial 
products in the markets, allowing investors to allocate financial resources more 
efficiently. Moreover, the development of sound market institutions can help reduce 
price fluctuations, making the markets more stable.  
 In addition, although the coefficients on KAOPEN enter the regression with a 
positive sign as expected, none is statistically significant even at the 10 % level. This 
appears to suggest that during the 2000s the relaxation of the financial market 
restrictions in the region has actually played an insignificant role in encouraging 
foreign portfolio investments. In addition, the finding also contradicts the evidence of 
Balli et al. (2009), who found that the relaxation of capital controls in host country 
(proxied by the Chinn-Ito index) indeed enhanced foreign portfolio holdings in the 
GCC markets.  
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For the sake of comparison, this study also re-estimates equation (3.4) for five 
sub-samples, including APT countries, the Euro area, Europe and North America, 
Middle East, and South America.
48
 As can be seen in Table 3.8, the augmented 
gravity model still fits the data relatively well in explaining more than 80-90 percent 
of the variation in cross-border asset holdings of APT countries, Europe and North 
America, and the Euro area. It is quite interesting, however, that the fit of the model 
to explain the variation decreases considerably for the cases of the Middle East and 
South America.  
Clearly, the most striking result in this table is perhaps a strong correlation 
between cross-border portfolio holdings and the capital market developments in the 
host countries. In particular, there is robust evidence that bilateral asset holdings 
substantially increase with (1) the ratio of public bond market capitalization to GDP, 
and (2) the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in the cases of APT countries, 
Europe and North America, and the Euro area. There are a number of other important 
findings worth noting. First, the results appear to suggest that the development of the 
private bond markets in the region, indeed, played a significant role in attracting 
foreign portfolio investments from Europe, North America, and APT countries. 
Second, it is found that the bilateral portfolio holdings of South American countries 
increased with the development of the equity markets in the region. And third, the 
                                                             
48 Note that APT source countries include Hong Kong SAR, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The euro area consists of Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. Middle 
East investing countries include Egypt, Kuwait, Israel, and Turkey. Europe and North America include 
Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. And 
finally, South America consists of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
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results indicate that the development of the public bond markets is the vital driving 
force behind the growing portfolio investments from Middle Eastern countries. 
Considering the influence of international financial centers on bilateral 
portfolio investments, observe that the financial center variable is statistically 
significant at the 1 % level only in the case of APT countries and its effects are quite 
large (2.16 and 2.22). This evidence appears to suggest that, aside from the capital 
market developments, the large financial centers have become one of the key 
determinants of foreign portfolio holdings of APT member countries. Although the 
link between the level of bilateral trade in goods and portfolio investments still 
stands, the evidence is only weak: cross-border portfolio holdings are found to be 
positively correlated with the level of imports, at best, at the 10% level of significance 
in the cases of the Euro area and APT countries (0.14 and 0.21 using Tobit 
technique).
49
 
Another piece of clear evidence in this table is the contrasting patterns of 
investment behavior among source countries. As can be seen, the correlation in 
growth rates variable enters the regression with a positive and significant sign only 
for the cases of Europe and North America, and the Euro area. In the case of APT 
countries, on the contrary, the estimated coefficients are negative and highly 
significant. This seems to suggest that investors from North America and Europe 
(including the Euro area), indeed, invested in the APT markets where the underlying 
                                                             
49 Again, for the sake of comparison between the relative strength of the independent variables within 
the model, this dissertation also provides the unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients, 
reported in Table 3.9. The overall results show that (1) the country-specific factors in a host country, in 
general, played a greater role in attracting foreign portfolio investments, compared to the bilateral 
variables, and (2) the development of the public bond markets and stock markets in East Asia has 
turned out to be one of the most critical driving forces in encouraging foreign portfolio investment 
from most regions of the world, both in terms of statistical significance and the relative strength of the 
influence. 
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economic fundamentals are more similar, whereas APT countries preferred investing 
within the region to pursue international diversification. Consequently, the 
understanding of these behaviors can help explain the negative correlation between 
cross-border portfolio holdings and the degree of financial openness in the case of 
APT countries. With the financial markets in the host countries becoming more 
liberalized, investors from APT countries tended to reallocate and rebalance their 
portfolio assets away from the markets in the region to mitigate the risk of asset-price 
boom-bust cycles in the short run.
50 If anything, the finding of these distinct patterns 
of investment behaviors also helps explain the reason why the degree of financial 
openness in Table 3.7 is insignificant in all specifications: it is because foreign 
investors across regions responded differently when the degree of financial openness 
had changed.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter seeks to understand the composition of cross-border portfolio 
holdings in East Asian countries. Special attention has been paid to several 
characteristics of host countries as well as at the bilateral level. 
At the bilateral level, geographical distance remains a critical factor in 
discouraging cross-border asset investments into East Asia. Despite a strong link 
between imports and bilateral portfolio holdings, this study only finds some evidence 
that trade integration in East Asia helped encourage intra-regional trade in financial 
assets. The investigation also reveals two distinct patterns of investment behavior 
                                                             
50 See Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) for the discussion on financial liberalization and the boom-
bust cycles in the short run. 
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among source countries: APT countries invested overseas for diversification reasons, 
while investors from Europe and North America pursued a higher rate of return in 
East Asian markets. 
At the country-specific level, there is robust evidence that the pattern of cross-
border asset holdings in East Asia is strongly correlated with the attractiveness of 
host-country specific characteristics. In particular, it has shown that the development 
of public bond as well as stock markets in East Asian economies helped attract 
foreign portfolio investment from most regions of the world. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
Table 3.1: Geographical Distribution of Total Cross-Border Portfolio Holdings by Selected Regions (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
       Host country 
 
Source country 
2001 2009* 
ASEAN + 
3 
Euro area United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Total ASEAN + 
3 
Euro area United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Total 
    Hong Kong SAR 30,256 20,422 39,253 31,070 205,600 202,474 82,931 92,398 89,600 810,780 
    Indonesia 153 142 249 74 717 803 743 470 476 4,696 
    Japan 21,077 364,562 490,200 110,356 1,289,754 61,644 754,410 919,346 182,501 2,845,894 
    Korea, Rep. of 1,731 740 3,763 431 8,035 25,094 9,523 32,764 10,072 102,372 
    Macao SAR 1,289 539 320 266 3,331 6,140 2,809 1,128 1,285 14,560 
    Malaysia 818 129 208 411 2,280 9,203 1,378 6,010 1,679 27,054 
    Philippines 112 50 1,844 25 2,135 441 172 2,315 300 4,995 
    Singapore 31,286 16,604 18,011 16,141 105,241 109,367 34,849 65,630 50,437 347,024 
    Thailand 255 147 292 31 825 16,200 2,052 1,999 324 23,410 
ASEAN + 3 86,977 403,335 554,140 158,805 1,617,918 431,366 888,867 1,122,060 336,674 4,180,785 
 (5.4) (24.9) (34.3) (9.8) (100) (10.3) (21.3) (26.8) (8.1) (100) 
Euro area 143,896 2,402,514 838,062 401,962 4,467,793 502,458 8,617,914 1,928,151 1,383,235 14,756,616 
 (3.2) (53.8) (18.8) (9.0) (100) (3.4) (58.4) (13.1) (9.4) (100) 
United States 303,016 641,662 …. 512,975 2,303,603 822,878 1,389,554 -- 958,256 5,952,867 
 (13.2) (27.9)  (22.3) (100) (13.8) (23.3)  (16.1) (100) 
United Kingdom 146,770 544,633 308,986 -- 1,304,044 289,121 1,191,602 840,541 -- 3,057,983 
 (11.3) (41.8) (23.7)  (100) (9.5) (39.0) (27.5)  (100) 
Source: IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey; Author’s calculation. 
Note: -- indicates a zero value or a value less than US$ 500,000, while …. indicates an unavailable datum. Regional allocation is in parentheses. * denotes 
preliminary data. 
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Table 3.2: Geographical Distribution of Cross-Border Holdings of Equity Securities by Selected Regions (in millions of U.S. 
dollars) 
       Host country 
 
Source country 
2001 2009* 
ASEAN + 
3 
Euro area United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Total ASEAN + 
3 
Euro area United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Total 
    Hong Kong SAR 11,460 6,129 11,458 22,698 94,615 147,824 27,619 18,501 53,009 498,880 
    Indonesia 16 1 …. -- 17 57 16 12 1 852 
    Japan 7,834 38,237 123,511 29,480 227,351 40,723 99,837 230,339 48,045 594,069 
    Korea, Rep. of 385 110 454 52 1,300 23,817 5,619 19,738 8,651 76,889 
    Macao SAR 604 75 54 121 1,032 4,218 1,020 211 662 7,647 
    Malaysia 692 30 68 24 1,332 6,800 748 4,965 1,439 20,150 
    Philippines 4 14 92 …. 111 2 11 10 -- 26 
    Singapore 14,303 2,493 6,034 2,688 31,319 63,122 5,947 24,252 13,181 153,639 
    Thailand 38 8 14 -- 82 476 1,251 483 13 3,323 
ASEAN + 3 35,336 47,097 141,685 55,063 357,159 287,039 142,068 298,511 125,001 1,355,475 
 (9.9) (13.2) (39.7) (15.4) (100) (21.2) (10.5) (22.0) (9.2) (100) 
Euro area 104,317 834,272 407,028 199,239 1,735,977 310,593 2,295,328 673,360 346,834 4,430,024 
 (6.0) (48.1) (23.4) (11.5) (100) (7.0) (51.8) (15.2) (7.8) (100) 
United States 261,515 461,583 …. 350,014 1,612,667 744,044 892,432 -- 561,670 3,995,298 
 (16.2) (28.6)  (21.7) (100) (18.6) (22.3)  (14.1) (100) 
United Kingdom 81,752 231,820 129,190 -- 558,379 214,057 311,977 299,813 -- 1,109,924 
 (14.6) (41.5) (23.1)  (100) (19.3) (28.1) (27.0)  (100) 
Source: IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey; Author’s calculation. 
Note: -- indicates a zero value or a value less than US$ 500,000, while …. indicates an unavailable datum. Regional allocation is in parentheses. * denotes 
preliminary data. 
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Table 3.3: Geographical Distribution of Cross-Border Holdings of Long-Term Debt Securities by Selected Regions (in millions of 
U.S. dollars) 
       Host country 
 
Source country 
2001 2009* 
ASEAN + 
3 
Euro area United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Total ASEAN + 
3 
Euro area United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Total 
    Hong Kong SAR 14,109 12,440 22,902 6,712 85,877 29,220 45,690 67,189 30,549 246,458 
    Indonesia 131 136 249 74 687 406 727 458 342 2,615 
    Japan 12,925 312,666 347,168 70,655 1,004,878 20,443 647,306 681,610 131,469 2,224,756 
    Korea, Rep. of 1,221 550 2,154 366 5,284 1,270 3,879 12,881 1,396 25,032 
    Macao SAR 652 440 263 145 2,123 1,579 1,628 863 581 6,247 
    Malaysia 122 89 115 34 551 2,352 626 728 237 6,493 
    Philippines 108 36 1,371 23 1,641 301 141 1,413 253 3,829 
    Singapore 9,251 10,125 11,269 2,487 41,960 33,474 17,693 24,188 10,296 120,999 
    Thailand 56 92 98 31 327 8,857 770 1,480 277 12,988 
ASEAN + 3 38,575 336,574 385,589 80,527 1,143,328 97,902 718,460 790,810 175,400 2,649,417 
 (3.4) (29.4) (33.7) (7.0) (100) (3.7) (27.1) (29.8) (6.6) (100) 
Euro area 39,262 1,469,099 321,153 156,713 2,436,391 104,216 5,768,443 1,053,812 866,270 9,201,505 
 (1.6) (60.0) (13.2) (6.4) (100) (1.1) (62.7) (11.5) (9.4) (100) 
United States 40,528 145,001 …. 80,868 555,358 70,420 401,966 -- 240,252 1,570,340 
 (7.3) (26.1)  (14.6) (100) (4.5) (25.6)  (15.3) (100) 
United Kingdom 64,074 268,529 160,994 -- 667,303 49,249 815,470 532,626 -- 1,815,134 
 (9.6) (40.2) (24.1)  (100) (2.7) (44.9) (29.3)  (100) 
Source: IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey; Author’s calculation. 
Note: -- indicates a zero value or a value less than US$ 500,000, while …. indicates an unavailable datum. Regional allocation is in parentheses. * denotes 
preliminary data. 
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Table 3.4: Geographical Distribution of Cross-Border Holdings of Short-Term Debt Securities by Selected Regions (in millions of 
U.S. dollars) 
       Host country 
 
Source country 
2001 2009* 
ASEAN + 
3 
Euro area United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Total ASEAN + 
3 
Euro area United 
States 
United 
Kingdom 
Total 
    Hong Kong SAR 4,687 1,853 4,893 1,660 25,108 25,430 9,622 6,708 6,042 65,442 
    Indonesia 6 5 …. …. 13 340 …. …. 133 1,229 
    Japan 318 13,659 19,521 10,221 57,525 478 7,267 7,397 2,987 27,069 
    Korea, Rep. of 125 80 1,155 13 1,451 7 25 145 25 451 
    Macao SAR 33 24 3 -- 176 343 161 54 42 666 
    Malaysia 4 10 25 353 397 51 4 317 3 411 
    Philippines …. …. 381 2 383 138 20 892 47 1,140 
    Singapore 7,732 3,986 708 10,966 31,962 12,771 11,209 17,190 26,960 72,386 
    Thailand 161 47 180 -- 416 6,867 31 36 34 7,099 
ASEAN + 3 13,066 19,664 26,866 23,215 117,431 46,425 28,339 32,739 36,273 175,893 
 (11.1) (16.7) (22.9) (19.8) (100) (26.4) (16.1) (18.6) (20.6) (100) 
Euro area 317 99,143 109,881 46,010 295,425 87,649 554,143 200,979 170,131 1,125,087 
 (0.1) (33.6) (37.2) (15.6) (100) (7.8) (49.3) (17.9) (15.1) (100) 
United States 973 35,078 …. 82,093 135,578 8,414 95,156 -- 156,334 387,229 
 (0.7) (25.9)  (60.6) (100) (2.2) (24.6)  (40.4) (100) 
United Kingdom 944 44,284 18,802 -- 78,362 25,815 64,155 8,102 -- 132,925 
 (1.2) (56.5) (24.0)  (100) (19.4) (48.3) (6.1)  (100) 
Source: IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey; Author’s calculation. 
Note: -- indicates a zero value or a value less than US$ 500,000, while …. indicates an unavailable datum. Regional allocation is in parentheses. * denotes 
preliminary data.
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log of total bilateral asset holdings 3830 3.699284 3.329652 0 13.24829 
Log of imports 3799 6.409784 2.270321 0 12.70091 
Log of distance 3830 8.481064 0.637698 6.00351 9.403454 
Common Language 3830 0.177285 0.381959 0 1 
Colony 3830 0.013838 0.116834 0 1 
Time zone difference 3830 5.895039 3.495036 0 15 
APT dummy 3830 0.162663 0.369106 0 1 
Correlation in growth rates – 5 year   3777 0.341684 0.488847 -0.98955 1 
Log of GDP – host  3830 12.76331 1.399413 10.48737 15.37568 
Financial center – host  3830 .2167102 .4120573      0 1 
Size of private bond market/GDP – host 3519 .2492151 .2057127 .0043425 .6922473 
Size of public bond market/GDP – host  3519 .4303117 .4015099 .0757536 1.722642 
Size of stock market/GDP – host  3569 1.31681 1.402985 .0044496 7.425013 
KAOPEN – host  3830 .7130527 1.387999 -1.14816 2.477618 
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Table 3.6: Determinants of Total Bilateral Asset Holdings in APT Countries, 
Controlling for Source- and Host-Country Fixed Effects 
 
Explanatory Variable: 
 
 
Panel FE 
 
Panel FE 
 
Tobit 
 
Tobit 
 
Log of imports 0.26*** 
(0.05) 
0.21*** 
(0.05) 
0.48*** 
(0.01) 
0.42*** 
(0.07) 
Log of distance  -0.85*** 
(0.25) 
 -1.01*** 
(0.31) 
Common Language  0.12 
(0.17) 
 -0.07 
(0.18) 
Colony  -0.39 
(0.35) 
 -0.21 
(0.18) 
Time zone difference  -0.27** 
(0.04) 
 -0.003 
(0.15) 
APT  1.20** 
(0.59) 
 1.37 
(2.15) 
Correlation in growth rates – 5 year  0.31*** 
(0.07) 
 0.27*** 
(0.08) 
Observations 3799 3777 3799 3777 
No. of source countries 57 57 57 57 
Adjusted R
2 
0.83 0.84   
Pseudo R
2
   0.38 0.38 
Note: the dependent variable is the log of (1 + real total portfolio holdings). Intercepts are not 
reported. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs dyads) are in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote 1%, 5%, and 10% level significance, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
Table 3.7: Determinants of Total Bilateral Asset Holdings in APT Countries, 
Controlling only for Source-Country Fixed Effects 
 
Explanatory Variable: 
 
 
Panel FE 
 
Panel FE 
 
Tobit 
 
Tobit 
 
Log of imports 0.42*** 
(0.05) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.62*** 
(0.07) 
0.16*** 
(0.06) 
Log of distance -0.36 
(0.28) 
-0.81*** 
(0.23) 
-0.45 
(0.31) 
-0.91*** 
(0.26) 
Common Language 0.54** 
(0.22) 
0.27* 
(0.14) 
0.69*** 
(0.23) 
0.33** 
(0.15) 
Colony -0.65 
(0.62) 
-0.10 
(0.11) 
-0.55 
(0.58) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
Time zone difference 0.71*** 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
0.98*** 
(0.12) 
0.07 
(0.11) 
APT (dropped) (dropped) 3.13*** 
(1.05) 
7.89*** 
(1.73) 
Correlation in growth rates – 5 year 0.56*** 
(0.08) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.68*** 
(0.10) 
0.13* 
(0.08) 
Log of GDP – host  0.38*** 
(0.06) 
 0.43*** 
(0.06) 
Financial center – host  0.64*** 
(0.17) 
 0.82*** 
(0.19) 
Size of private bond market/GDP – host  1.02*** 
(0.24) 
 1.13*** 
(0.27) 
Size of public bond market/GDP – host  1.05*** 
(0.17) 
 1.22*** 
(0.18) 
Size of stock market/GDP – host  0.23*** 
(0.04) 
 0.29*** 
(0.04) 
KAOPEN – host  0.06 
(0.05) 
 0.05 
(0.06) 
Observations 3777 3369 3777 3369 
No. of source countries 57 57 57 57 
Adjusted R2 0.78 0.86   
Pseudo R2   0.31 0.40 
Note: the dependent variable is the log of (1 + real total portfolio holdings). Intercepts are not 
reported. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs dyads) are in parentheses. ***, **, and 
* denote 1%, 5%, and 10% level significance, respectively.
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Table 3.8: Determinants of Bilateral Portfolio Holdings in APT Countries for Selected Country Groups 
Explanatory Variable: APT The Euro area Europe and North 
America 
Middle East South America 
Panel FE Tobit Panel FE Tobit Panel FE Tobit Panel FE Tobit Panel FE Tobit 
Log of imports 0.21* 
(0.11) 
0.21* 
(0.11) 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
0.12 
(0.08) 
0.22 
(0.26) 
0.18 
(0.32) 
0.10 
(0.10) 
0.35 
(0.28) 
Log of distance -0.66*** 
(0.23) 
-0.68*** 
(0.23) 
-0.93 
(0.79) 
-0.60 
(0.89) 
-0.54 
(0.60) 
-0.60 
(0.61) 
2.85 
(2.28) 
4.75 
(3.80) 
-0.59 
(1.57) 
-4.44 
(3.70) 
Common Language -0.17 
(0.24) 
-0.19 
(0.24) 
0.22 
(0.16) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
0.46*** 
(0.16) 
0.46*** 
(0.16) 
-1.06 
(0.64) 
-1.02 
(0.83) 
(dropped)  
Colony (dropped)  0.05 
(0.18) 
0.16 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(0.16) 
(dropped)  (dropped)  
Time zone difference 0.07 
(0.22) 
0.09 
(0.23) 
0.53*** 
(0.14) 
0.65*** 
(0.16) 
0.25 
(0.19) 
0.24 
(0.20) 
-0.17 
(0.56) 
-0.48 
(0.93) 
0.23 
(0.26) 
1.10 
(0.68) 
Correlation in growth rates – 5 year -0.64*** 
(0.16) 
-0.69*** 
(0.17) 
0.22** 
(0.11) 
0.23** 
(0.12) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.17 
(0.23) 
0.22 
(0.31) 
0.20 
(0.16) 
0.61 
(0.41) 
Log of GDP – host 0.10 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.09) 
0.34*** 
(0.10) 
0.38*** 
(0.11) 
0.57*** 
(0.12) 
0.56*** 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.46) 
0.37 
(0.65) 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.32 
(0.34) 
Financial center – host 2.16*** 
(0.49) 
2.22*** 
(0.50) 
0.09 
(0.35) 
0.12 
(0.39) 
0.62* 
(0.36) 
0.63* 
(0.35) 
1.52 
(0.97) 
2.97* 
(1.51) 
-0.36 
(0.44) 
0.13 
(1.16) 
Size of private bond market/GDP – host 1.36*** 
(0.45) 
1.35*** 
(0.45) 
-0.22 
(0.42) 
-0.43 
(0.47) 
0.94* 
(0.53) 
0.96* 
(0.54) 
0.96 
(1.41) 
2.44 
(2.14) 
0.21 
(0.52) 
0.27 
(1.31) 
Size of public bond market/GDP – host 1.07*** 
(0.35) 
1.14*** 
(0.37) 
0.92*** 
(0.23) 
0.98*** 
(0.25) 
1.08*** 
(0.27) 
1.09*** 
(0.27) 
1.08* 
(0.55) 
1.55** 
(0.74) 
0.83 
(0.58) 
1.53 
(0.95) 
Size of stock market/GDP – host 0.33*** 
(0.08) 
0.34*** 
(0.08) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.29*** 
(0.06) 
0.27*** 
(0.06) 
0.27*** 
(0.06) 
0.22 
(0.15) 
0.24 
(0.17) 
0.22* 
(0.11) 
0.61*** 
(0.20) 
KAOPEN – host -0.30** 
(0.14) 
-0.31** 
(0.15) 
0.17 
(0.12) 
0.15 
(0.14) 
0.17* 
(0.10) 
0.17* 
(0.10) 
-0.31 
(0.25) 
-0.61 
(0.38) 
-0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.40 
(0.35) 
Observation 552 552 916 916 607 607 185 185 363 363 
No. of source countries 8 8 14 14 8 8 4 4 6 6 
Adjusted R2 0.82  0.83  0.91  0.48  0.38  
Pseudo R2  0.35  0.36  0.51  0.20  0.25 
 Note: the dependent variable is the log of (1 + real total portfolio holdings). Intercepts are not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs dyads) 
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% level significance, respectively. 
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Table 3.9: Unstandardized and Standardized Estimates: The Beta Coefficients 
Explanatory Variable: APT The Euro area Europe and North 
America 
Middle East South America 
Panel FE Beta Panel FE Beta Panel FE Beta Panel FE Beta Panel FE Beta 
Log of imports 0.21* 
(0.11) 
0.10 0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.07 0.12 
(0.08) 
0.10 0.22 
(0.26) 
0.18 0.10 
(0.10) 
0.12 
Log of distance -0.66*** 
(0.23) 
-0.11 -0.93 
(0.79) 
-0.05 -0.54 
(0.60) 
-0.04 2.85 
(2.28) 
0.23 -0.59 
(1.57) 
-0.03 
Common Language -0.17 
(0.24) 
-0.03 0.22 
(0.16) 
0.02 0.46*** 
(0.16) 
0.08 -1.06 
(0.64) 
-0.30 (dropped)  
Colony (dropped)  0.05 
(0.18) 
0.002 -0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.002 (dropped)  (dropped)  
Time zone difference 0.07 
(0.22) 
0.02 0.53*** 
(0.14) 
0.16 0.25 
(0.19) 
0.24 -0.17 
(0.56) 
-0.08 0.23 
(0.26) 
0.14 
Correlation in growth rates – 5 year -0.64*** 
(0.16) 
-0.10 0.22** 
(0.11) 
0.04 0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.05 0.17 
(0.23) 
0.05 0.20 
(0.16) 
0.06 
Log of GDP – host 0.10 
(0.09) 
0.05 0.34*** 
(0.10) 
0.15 0.57*** 
(0.12) 
0.26 0.12 
(0.46) 
0.09 0.09 
(0.14) 
0.08 
Financial center – host 2.16*** 
(0.49) 
0.32 0.09 
(0.35) 
0.01 0.62* 
(0.36) 
0.09 1.52 
(0.97) 
0.38 -0.36 
(0.44) 
-0.09 
Size of private bond market/GDP – host 1.36*** 
(0.45) 
0.10 -0.22 
(0.42) 
-0.02 0.94* 
(0.53) 
0.07 0.96 
(1.41) 
0.11 0.21 
(0.52) 
0.03 
Size of public bond market/GDP – host 1.07*** 
(0.35) 
0.14 0.92*** 
(0.23) 
0.13 1.08*** 
(0.27) 
0.15 1.08* 
(0.55) 
0.28 0.83 
(0.58) 
0.21 
Size of stock market/GDP – host 0.33*** 
(0.08) 
0.16 0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.12 0.27*** 
(0.06) 
0.13 0.22 
(0.15) 
0.19 0.22* 
(0.11) 
0.19 
KAOPEN – host -0.30** 
(0.14) 
-0.14 0.17 
(0.12) 
0.08 0.17* 
(0.10) 
0.08 -0.31 
(0.25) 
-0.24 -0.05 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
Observation 552  916  607  185  363  
No. of source countries 8  14  8  4  6  
Adjusted R2 0.82  0.83  0.91  0.48  0.38  
Pseudo R2           
 Note: the dependent variable is the log of (1 + real total portfolio holdings). Intercepts are not reported. Robust standard errors (clustered by country-pairs dyads) 
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% level significance, respectively. 
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Appendix Table A3.1: Countries in Sample 
Argentina Greece Philippines * 
Australia Hong Kong SAR of China * Poland 
Austria Hungary Portugal 
Barbados Iceland Romania 
Belgium India Russian Federation 
Brazil Indonesia * Singapore * 
Bulgaria Ireland Slovak Republic 
Canada Israel Slovenia 
Chile Italy South Africa 
China * Japan * Spain 
Colombia Kazakhstan Sweden 
Costa Rica Korea, Republic of * Switzerland 
Czech Republic Kuwait Thailand * 
Denmark Latvia Turkey 
Egypt Malaysia * Ukraine 
Estonia Mexico United Kingdom 
Finland Netherlands United States 
France New Zealand Uruguay 
Germany Norway Venezuela 
Gibraltar Pakistan Vietnam * 
Note: * denotes the host countries in the sample. All countries in the sample are included in the 
regression as the source countries except China and Vietnam because these two nations do not 
currently participate in the survey. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Concluding Remarks 
 
While it seems clear that ASEAN member states have benefited from trade 
liberalization under the ASEAN PTA and AFTA frameworks, this is not the case for 
all industries. The empirical evidence here illustrates that the formation of the RTAs 
among ASEAN countries has generated a substantial increase in intra-regional trade 
in manufactured (i.e., differentiated and reference-priced) products. However, the 
lack of strong evidence makes it difficult to conclude whether homogeneous (i.e., 
agricultural raw material and unprocessed) products have actually gained from the 
RTAs. 
This evidence should serve as a reminder that assessing the impact of RTAs 
on intra-regional trade at the aggregate level alone can lead to misinterpretation if the 
degree of trade liberalization is widely different across product categories. The recent 
process of trade liberalization among ASEAN member states is a good example. 
While the agreement on the CEPT scheme for AFTA consisted of all manufactured 
products, agricultural raw materials and unprocessed products have usually been 
subjected to ―a waiver of any concession.‖ Under such circumstances, the formation 
of RTAs indeed played different roles in redirecting trade flows across product types 
since the degree of trade liberalization was different, and thus should be examined 
across each industry separately. 
In emerging-market economies, trade diversion is less likely to occur, 
compared to the trading blocs between developed countries. This is because the trade-
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creating effects resulting from the rapid economic growth tend to counterbalance the 
initial trade diversion effects on non-member states over the long run. This perception 
is supported by the empirical evidence here that while trade diversion took place in 
the EU and NAFTA, the phenomenon did not exist in ASEAN and MERCOSUR 
economies for all product categories. After all, it can be shown that the establishment 
of the RTAs between emerging-market countries has unambiguously improved world 
welfare, regardless of the product category. 
The empirical findings on the determinants of bilateral trade flows also 
reinforce the existing literature in two respects. First, the analysis of the nature of the 
home market effect emphasizes that the home market effect tends to vary 
systematically across product categories; i.e., the home market effect is found to exist 
in differentiated and reference-priced products while the effect is reversed for 
homogeneous products. Second, the results indicate that similarity of demand 
structures between a pair of countries plays a significant role in determining the 
trading patterns in differentiated products, while weak evidence of the Linder 
hypothesis implies that the conjecture should not apply to homogeneous products. 
Despite that, however, neither the home market effect nor the Linder effect is found 
to exist robustly within the East Asian region. 
It should be noted here that although the analysis of trade patterns at the 
product level provides a great deal of insightful information, the lack of bilateral trade 
data from 2000 onwards has limited our assessment in some respects. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, the past decade has seen the rapid proliferation of RTAs as well as a 
surge in intra-regional trade in the East Asian region. However, because of the limited 
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dataset, the impact of the recent RTAs on intra- and extra-regional trade in each 
product category cannot be examined. In addition, it is likely that the recent economic 
cooperation in East Asia, especially in the context of the AEC framework, will play a 
major role in transforming the region into a more integrated area of free movement of 
goods, service, and investment. This development would enable transnational 
cooperation to fully exploit their competitive advantages and economies of scale. In 
this regard, the nature of the home market effect could become more pronounced in 
explaining the patterns of trade across the region. Unfortunately, the lack of trade data 
prevents us from testing the home market effect in the aftermath of the East Asian 
financial crises. Once the bilateral trade data at the product level are readily available, 
of course, these issues will be particularly interesting areas for future research. 
Another lesson we have learned from the experiment is that the regional trade 
integration not only generated a surge in intra-regional trade, but also played an 
indirect role in encouraging the regional financial integration in East Asia. This 
positive correlation between bilateral trade and portfolio holdings can be explained 
through several mechanisms. On the one hand, widening and deepening trade 
collaboration in the region helped reduce the degree of asymmetric information 
through some form of familiarity effects, spurring the cross-border portfolio 
investments. On the other hand, holding the financial securities issued by a resident of 
neighboring countries can be exploited to hedge against consumption risk from 
importation due to country-specific shocks in that economy (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 
2004). 
 
 
93 
 
Along with the importance of the bilateral factors, the results show that the 
country-specific characteristics in host countries also played an essential role in 
attracting international portfolio investments. In particular, the development of the 
public bond markets and stock markets in East Asia has turned out to be one of the 
key driving forces in encouraging foreign portfolio investment from most parts of the 
world. 
Ever since the East Asian financial crises of the late 1990s, there has been 
remarkable progress in the development of the capital markets and regional financial 
integration in East Asia. Above all, the region had learned several lessons from these 
crises. Some critics have argued that the failure of financial regulation and 
supervision indeed played a crucial role in triggering the crises and suggested that the 
financial regulatory system in the region must be reformed. While there is some truth 
to this, it is also clear that the financial crises in some countries could have been 
limited or even prevented if East Asian regional cooperation to manage the crisis had 
been in place. A key lesson from the crises is, therefore, the need to strengthen 
regional collaboration to manage financial contagion and other external shocks in 
times of crisis. 
Over the years, the processes of capital market development and regional 
financial cooperation in East Asia have been moving ahead. Several indicators 
demonstrating these improvements include a substantial increase in market 
capitalization as well as the ratio of market capitalization to GDP, improved capital 
market infrastructure, and improved financial regulation and supervision. In terms of 
regional cooperation, East Asian countries have agreed to establish two main regional 
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initiatives -- the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI) and the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization (CMIM). The former is designed to bolster liquidity and efficiency 
of the domestic bond markets in the region while the latter aims at providing financial 
support for member states in times of liquidity difficulties. 
Despite substantial improvement, it is clear that further efforts are required to 
ensure sustainable development of the capital market and deeper regional financial 
integration. In this dissertation, it is found that capital market development can 
deepen financial integration in East Asia. Thus, policymakers should implement 
policies that help develop bigger and well-functioning equity and bond markets. 
These priority areas include (1) increasing the variety of the financial products in the 
markets and (2) developing sound market institutions and infrastructures. Greater 
financial product variety would allow investors to allocate financial resources more 
efficiently, while the development of sound market institutions will help reduce price 
fluctuations, making the markets more stable. Furthermore, asymmetric information 
tends to deter cross-border portfolio investment; therefore, policymakers should also 
implement policies that help improve the information flows to international portfolio 
investors. A larger conduit for information transmission would reduce the degree of 
information asymmetry, encouraging cross-border portfolio investment. 
The general consensus seems to be that the lack of liquidity in the East Asian 
capital markets is one reason why international portfolio investors invest so little in 
East Asia. Despite that, however, there is no empirical evidence using the CPIS 
dataset to support this.
51
 Therefore, further studies on the determinants of cross-
border portfolio holdings in East Asia should also pay attention to the role of market 
                                                             
51 One exception is the work of García-Herrero et al. (2009). 
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liquidity. Once the empirical evidence becomes clear, policy implications on this 
point can be deduced. 
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